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ABSTRACT 
The Impact of Consumer Loss Aversion on Pricing* 
by Paul Heidhues and Botond Kőszegi 
We develop a model in which a profit-maximizing monopolist with uncertain cost 
of production sells to loss-averse, yet rational, consumers.  We first introduce 
(portable) techniques for analyzing the demand of such consumers, and then 
investigate the monopolist's pricing strategy.  Compared to lower possible 
purchase prices, paying a higher price in the firm's pricing distribution is 
assessed by consumers as a loss, decreasing demand for the firm's product. 
We provide conditions under which a firm with continuously distributed marginal 
cost responds by (locally) eliminating this "comparison effect" and choosing a 
discrete price distribution; that is, prices are "sticky".  Price stickiness is more 
likely to obtain when the cost distribution has high density, the price 
responsiveness of demand is low, or consumers are likely to purchase.  
Whether or not prices are sticky, the monopolist wants to at least mitigate the 
comparison effect, leading to countercyclical markups.  On the other hand, if 
consumers expect to buy the product, they experience a loss if they end up not 
consuming it, increasing their willingness to pay for it.  Thus, despite the 
tendency toward price stability, there are also circumstances in which a firm 
with unchanging cost offers random "sales" to increase customers' expectation 
to consume, attracting more demand at higher prices. 
 
 
Keywords:  Reference-dependent utility, price stickiness, monopoly pricing, kinked 
demand curve, countercyclical markups, sales, promotions, (seemingly) 
predatory pricing. 
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ZUSAMMENFASSUNG 
Strategisches Preissetzungsverhalten mit verlustaversen Konsumenten 
Wir analysieren das optimale Verhalten eines profitmaximierenden 
Monopolisten mit stochastischen Produktionskosten, der an rationale, 
verlustaverse Konsumenten verkauft. Hierzu entwickelt der Beitrag 
übertragbare Techniken, die es erlauben, die Nachfrage von verlustaversen 
Konsumenten herzuleiten, und bestimmt die optimale Preissetzungsstrategie 
des Monopolisten. Ein Konsument empfindet einen Verlust, wenn er den von 
ihm gezahlten Kaufpreis mit erwarteten niedrigeren Preisen des Monopolisten 
vergleicht. Dieser Verlust reduziert die Zahlungsbereitschaft des Konsumenten 
und senkt somit seine Nachfrage. Der Beitrag zeigt auf, unter welchen 
Bedingungen eine Firma mit kontinuierlich verteilten Grenzkosten diesen 
„Vergleichseffekt“ (lokal) eliminiert, indem sie eine diskrete Preisverteilung wählt 
--- also, eine Preisverteilung mit Preisstarrheit. Diese Preisstarrheit tritt umso 
eher auf, je höher die Dichte der Kostenverteilung, je niedriger die 
Nachfrageelastizität oder je größer die Kaufwahrscheinlichkeit des 
Konsumenten ist. Unabhängig davon, ob die optimale Preisverteilung 
Preisstarrheit aufweist oder nicht, schwächt der Monopolist diesen 
Vergleichseffekt ab in dem er antizyklische Preisaufschläge verlangt. Auf der 
anderen Seite führt die Kauferwartung des Konsumenten dazu, dass er einen 
Verlust realisiert, wenn er das Gut nicht konsumieren kann. Eine höhere 
Kauferwartung führt somit zu einer höheren Zahlungsbereitschaft des 
Konsumenten. Daher kann es trotz der Tendenz zur Preisstarrheit auch 
Umstände geben, unter denen eine Unternehmung mit fixen Grenzkosten 
zufällige „Sonderangebote“ macht, welche die Kauferwartung des Konsumenten 
erhöhen und somit mehr Nachfrage bei höheren Preisen generieren. 
 
1 Introduction
Experimental investigations of small-scale trading decisions, as well as monetary risk taking, in-
dicate that preferences are reference-dependent—people compare economic outcomes to relevant
“reference points”, not only evaluate them according to absolute measures. One of the most ro-
bust and quantitatively signiﬁcant regularities related to reference-dependent preferences is loss
aversion—people are more sensitive to losses relative to their reference point than to gains relative
to it.1 Evidence from the economics and marketing literatures indicates that reference dependence
and loss aversion inﬂuences consumers’ behavior in the marketplace,2 and that ﬁrms seem to be
aware of this fact (Blinder et al 1998, Marketing News 1985).3
Inspired by these ﬁndings, we analyze the strategic pricing behavior of a proﬁt-maximizing
monopolist facing loss-averse consumers. Our results can help explain, under a single umbrella,
three stylized facts about the distribution and time pattern of prices for consumer goods. First,
regular prices are “sticky” in that adjustments are infrequent (Carlton 1986, Kashyap 1995, Blinder
1998, for example), and that the price often returns to the same level even when it does change
(Chevalier, Kashyap, and Rossi 2000). Second, markups are “countercyclical”: Proﬁt margins are
lower in booms than in recessions (Bils 1987, Chevalier and Scharfstein 1996, and others). Third,
temporary sales and promotions are common (Chevalier, Kashyap, and Rossi 2000).
We begin in Section 2 by outlining a model of consumer behavior with loss aversion, and
developing generally applicable techniques for working with the model. A major challenge in
1 In selling and purchasing decisions, subjects ask for a higher price when selling a good than they are willing to
pay when oﬀered the opportunity to buy the same good, even though the two roles are randomly allocated between
subjects. This probably occurs because subjects construe giving up the object they have just acquired as a loss, and
are very sensitive to this loss (Kahneman, Knetsch, and Thaler 1990, 1991). In monetary gambles, loss aversion is
reﬂected in people’s reluctance to accept small favorable lotteries, presumably because they are more afraid of the
possibility of loss than they are thrilled about a somewhat larger gain (Kahneman and Tversky 1979, Rabin 2000).
2 Genesove and Mayer (2001) document that sellers in the Boston housing market set higher selling prices if they
have suﬀered a loss relative to their purchase price. Odean (1998) ﬁnds that small investors are more reluctant to sell
losing stocks than winning stocks, signiﬁcantly decreasing their returns in the process. And as a possible explanation
for wage stability, Bewley (1998) states that “[d]eclines in living standards disrupt people’s lives and cause much more
damage to well-being than corresponding increases improve it. Such declines are especially disruptive for people used
to stable incomes.”
3 In an early treatise, Hall and Hitch (1939) write “[c]hanges in prices [...] are disliked by merchants and customers.
Several entrepreneurs referred explicitly to the fact that there are conventional prices to which customers are attached,
and that these have to be charged, which means that in these cases only large changes in price which are clearly
unproﬁtable are possible.”
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building a complete theory lies in the speciﬁcation of the reference point.4 In particular, one could
specify a consumer’s reference point in the money to be paid for an item as either her status quo
(so that paying is always assessed as a loss), her customary spending on the good (so that only
paying more than at other times is seen as a loss), or the regular price (so that only paying an
increased price is considered a loss). To sort out these possibilities without having to make arbitrary
exogenous assumptions in each situation, a parsimonious theory of pricing and loss aversion should
ideally build on a suﬃciently general and precise speciﬁcation of the reference point.
Our model draws on the framework developed in Ko˝szegi and Rabin (2004), in which a de-
cisionmaker’s reference point is determined by her recent expectations (i.e. probabilistic beliefs)
about the outcomes she is going to get. For example, a consumer who expects to eat a nice dinner
experiences a sensation of loss if she ﬁnds that her favorite restaurant is temporarily closed. But
she also experiences a loss from paying more for her dinner than she had previously anticipated.
Based on this perspective, a person’s reference point in money depends on market conditions and
her own anticipated behavior. The reference point is close to the consumer’s status quo if she
expects to buy the good relatively rarely, or to be able to acquire it very cheaply. If the ﬁrm always
charges the same price and she expects to buy at that price, it is this “regular price” to which she
compares money outlays. And if she expects to pay a stochastic price, she has no single reference
price; instead, in our framework she compares money outcomes to each possibility in the reference
lottery, and takes the average of these gain-loss sensations.
Having assumed that expectations are the reference point, our model’s predictions rely on a
theory of how expectations are determined. To complete our model, we adapt Ko˝szegi and Rabin’s
(2004) framework: We assume that the reference point is determined endogenously, in a personal
equilibrium, by the requirement that the stochastic outcome implied by optimal behavior conditional
on expectations be consistent with expectations.
4 Indeed, the lack of a precise theory of reference point determination may have limited the application of previous
models (Kahneman and Tversky 1979, Tversky and Kahneman 1991). Most applications of loss aversion are in the
area of ﬁnance. In one of the ﬁrst prominent ﬁnancial applications, Benartzi and Thaler (1995) argue that loss
aversion can explain the equity premium if investors check their portfolios (and suﬀer gains and losses) about once
a year. Barberis, Huang, and Thaler (2003) formally show that within a large class of preferences, observed risk
attitudes can only be explained by a combination of loss aversion and “narrow bracketing”, the idea that investors
do not integrate current risky choices with risks they already face. Barberis, Huang, and Santos (2001) study asset
prices in an economy populated by loss averse consumers.
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In our full market models, a risk-neutral monopolist interacts with loss averse consumers of
the above type. The monopolist faces an uncertain cost of production, and has to decide how
to map diﬀerent cost realizations into prices.5 To capture, in a reduced-form model, the idea
that a patient ﬁrm facing rational consumers would realize that these consumers learn the price
distribution over time, we begin by assuming that the monopolist commits to a cost-contingent
pricing distribution before observing the cost realization.6 The consumer observes the pricing
distribution while forming expectations about her own price-contingent behavior (but does not
necessarily know the cost distribution or observe the realization). Next, the ﬁrm’s cost is drawn,
the price is realized, and the consumer decides whether or not to buy a single item of the good.
For most of the paper, we assume that the consumer’s willingness to buy the good is subject
to a shock, which she observes just before making her purchase decision. This assumption is
both psychologically reasonable (many unpredictable factors may aﬀect the consumer’s decision)
and technically useful, as it turns a discrete decision into a continuous demand curve. To maintain
discipline, we impose a condition on the shock such that personal equilibrium is unique for any price
distribution, doing so with the impression that—as long as jumps between equilibria in response
to price changes are not a concern—this does not aﬀect the intuition for any of our main results.7
Our ﬁrst ﬁnding is that even if marginal costs are continuously distributed, in some cases the ﬁrm
charges only ﬁnitely many prices. We interpret this as price stickiness. Intuitively, random prices
induce uncertainty for the consumer as to how much she has to pay for the good. If she purchases
at a relatively high price, she compares it to lower prices she could have paid, and experiences a
sensation of loss. The anticipation of this loss reduces her demand for the good. By not exposing the
consumer to small price movements, therefore, the ﬁrm increases her overall demand and thus its
5 While in our formal model we focus exclusively on cost shocks, we argue that our results would be similar if the
underlying source of uncertainty was in inframarginal demand.
6 Although we work with a static model in which the ﬁrm faces a random cost, like previous authors (Shilony
1977, Varian 1980) we interpret our model more generally, and translate the static pricing results into pricing over
time. As the pricing decisions are repeated, draws from the distribution translate into a price series. Thus, a stochastic
price corresponds to price variation that is not predictable very far in advance, such as ﬂuctuations due to unexpected
sales. We will discuss in more detail how our static assumptions, especially regarding commitment, relate to pricing
over time.
7 In particular, the key result in our no-commitment model does not take advantage of the uniqueness of personal
equilibrium. Since in that case the ﬁrm chooses its price after the consumer has formed expectations, changes in the
price cannot aﬀect the personal equilibrium played by her.
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sales revenues. While the ﬁrm also has a classical productive eﬃciency rationale for diﬀerentiating
production levels according to marginal cost, we identify suﬃcient conditions under which the
increase in revenues dominates this consideration.
In addition to showing that price stickiness is possible, our model yields a series of intuitive
predictions about the circumstances in which stickiness is likely to be observed. We show that if
the cost distribution has suﬃciently low density (i.e. the environment is quite “unpredictable”),
the monopolist chooses a nonatomic price distribution. The ﬁrm is also more likely to do so if its
consumers buy the product less often, and if demand is more elastic. And looking within a price
distribution, the price is most likely to be sticky in regions where it is most likely to fall. That is,
the price distribution might be characterized by a few isolated and often observed “regular prices”,
with many other prices the ﬁrm charges only occasionally.
Even when the monopolist’s price distribution is nonatomic, it is observably diﬀerent from that
of a ﬁrm facing standard consumers. In particular, an economist who studies the ﬁrm’s behavior
and the realized market demand curve, but ignores that demand depends on the consumer’s expec-
tations, would conclude that the ﬁrm systematically deviates from proﬁt maximization in a number
of ways. Most importantly, she would ﬁnd that the ﬁrm’s markups are (too) countercyclical. When
the ﬁrm decides how to price in low-cost states, it needs to take into consideration that the low price
it would like to charge would form a basis for an (unfavorable) comparison should prices be higher,
decreasing the consumer’s demand in these latter states of the world. Therefore, the monopolist is
reluctant to aggressively cut its price in response to low cost realizations.
In our ﬁrst model, the ﬁrm’s ability to beneﬁt from a sticky price seems to rely strongly on
its patience in setting the consumer’s price expectations, modeled as commitment to a strategy in
our setting. Suppose instead that the ﬁrm cannot commit to a pricing strategy, and the consumer
expects it to charge a nonatomic price distribution. Then, the demand curve is continuously
diﬀerentiable, and the ﬁrm’s price indeed varies continuously with cost, seemingly indicating that a
market equilibrium with a continuous pricing distribution should always exist. In contrast, Section
4 shows that our price stickiness result survives: For suﬃciently dense cost distributions the ﬁrm
charges a deterministic price in any equilibrium. If the consumer expected stochastic prices, the
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losses due to comparisons between the realized price and lower possible ones would make her demand
more responsive at higher than at lower prices in the anticipated distribution. This would lead
the ﬁrm to charge less dispersed prices than the consumer expects. As a result, the equilibrium
collapses to a single price. At this price, the demand curve is kinked. Importantly, the kink is
an endogenous equilibrium phenomenon, not an exogenously assumed feature of the consumer’s
preferences. Strikingly, we obtain our result despite a great indeterminacy of the equilibrium price:
A continuum of deterministic prices are possible.
In Section 5, we consider the impact of the multiplicity of personal equilibria on market out-
comes. We show that when the ﬁrm can commit to a pricing distribution, multiplicity might give
rise to random pricing even for deterministic costs. We interpret this as strategic sales by the mo-
nopolist. Indeterminacy of personal equilibrium arises because if the consumer expects to consume
the good, she assesses not buying it as a loss, increasing her willingness to pay for it; but if she
expects not to buy, it is spending money that she views as unpleasant, decreasing her willingness
to pay. At ﬁrst, this may seem to imply that consumer loss aversion greatly beneﬁts the ﬁrm if
she plays the former equilibrium, and greatly hurts it if she plays the latter one. Surprisingly, the
situation is much less symmetric, and sales play a crucial role in generating the asymmetry. If the
customer tends to play an unfavorable equilibrium, the monopolist sometimes oﬀers a suﬃciently
attractive sale that would induce her to buy even if she expected not to do so. This increases her
anticipated probability of purchase, and leads her to buy even at higher prices. Loosely speaking,
therefore, sales manipulate consumers into playing a personal equilibrium with a high probability
of purchase, signiﬁcantly increasing the ﬁrm’s minimum possible proﬁts. While we feel this is an
important reason for sales in some situations, this variant of our model has the drawback that it
can support a wide range of pricing policies and proﬁts.
To summarize, our model oﬀers an intuitive explanation for both price stickiness and counter-
cyclical markups, and may also yield a natural reason for sales. In Section 6, we discuss some ex-
isting evidence for these seemingly contradictory predictions. We also review the related industrial
organization literature, which explains each of these various pricing phenomena with completely
diﬀerent models. We point out possible extensions of the model, and conclude, in Section 7.
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Figure 1: Timing
2 Model
The timing of our basic model is illustrated in Figure 1. A monopolist, who interacts with a single
(representative) consumer, ﬁrst commits to a pricing distribution, which the consumer observes.
We will think of the pricing distribution as a map from the cost realization to a price. For our
results, however, it is only important that the consumer observes the resulting price distribution.
Then, the consumer forms expectations about her own price-contingent behavior. Next, the ﬁrm’s
marginal cost is drawn, and the price is realized. Finally, a shock to the consumer’s willingness to
buy is realized, and she decides whether or not to buy a single item of the good.
Two comments about this basic setup are in order. First, although all of our concepts and
deﬁnitions would make sense without this, we include in our model the psychologically reasonable
element that there is randomness in the consumer’s willingness to buy the good. One can think
of many factors at the time of purchase that impact the consumer’s decision—other demands on
her time, her mood, the weather, and so forth—that are neither under the control of the ﬁrm, nor
perfectly predictable by the consumer. Adding a shock to the consumer’s decision does not aﬀect
the key properties of loss aversion that our model captures, and it turns a binary decision into a
(better-behaved) continuous demand curve. In addition, we will show that if the shock is suﬃciently
variable, personal equilibrium is unique for any price distribution, while this is not the case in
general. Basing our entire analysis on (ad hoc) assumptions about equilibrium selection would
raise the concern that our results are largely driven by these assumptions. To maintain discipline,
therefore, for most of the paper we will restrict attention to settings where demand is uniquely
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deﬁned. But the intuition for our results holds more generally as long as relevant changes to the
ﬁrm’s price distribution do not induce jumps in the personal equilibrium played by the consumer. In
particular, the key result in our no-commitment model does not rely on the uniqueness of personal
equilibrium. And Section 5 examines some market outcomes under commitment when personal
equilibrium is not in general unique, and further motivates the inclusion of the shock in the model.
Second, although our model is static in that there is only a single purchase decision by the
consumer, it can be translated in a natural way to a dynamic situation. If cost realizations are
independent across periods, a dynamic pricing problem can be modeled as repetitions of our static
framework. In this view, the static price distribution implied by our model generates a dynamic
price series through diﬀerent realizations of the distribution. Even if cost (and therefore price)
realizations are correlated over time, if consumer preferences are based on suﬃciently lagged ex-
pectations, the logic of a dynamic model would be very similar to repetitions of our static one.
Relatedly, our commitment assumption captures, in a static reduced form, a patient ﬁrm’s dy-
namic incentives in setting the optimal long-run price distribution. A patient ﬁrm realizes that over
time, consumers would learn the distribution of prices and incorporate it into their expectations.
As a result, such a ﬁrm internalizes the eﬀect of its pricing decisions on consumer expectations.8
There are also ﬁrms and circumstances where pricing choices are more myopic due to discounting,
ﬁnancial distress, etc. Therefore, in Section 4 we also analyze our model without commitment.
2.1 Individual Decisionmaking Problem
We ﬁrst model the consumer’s preferences and behavior, and based on this speciﬁcation of demand,
we go on to deﬁne a full market equilibrium. The model of the consumer’s behavior is derived from
Ko˝szegi and Rabin (2004). Speciﬁcally, the consumer makes the simple decision of whether to
purchase a single item of a single good. We normalize her initial wealth to zero. We start by
deﬁning the consumer’s utility when both the outcome and the reference point are riskless, and
without the shock to her willingness to buy. Denote by k1, r1 ∈ {0, 1} her consumption and
8 A key result in the reputation literature in game theory provides a foundation for our formulation. Fudenberg
and Levine (1988, 1989) consider a repeated game with a series of short-run players playing a long-run player who
is committed to the Stackelberg strategy with (small) positive probability. They prove that if the long-run player is
suﬃciently patient, outcomes are close to the Stackelberg outcome.
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reference point in the good, and by k2, r2 ∈ R her consumption and reference point in money,
and let k = (k1, k2), r = (r1, r2). Utility is composed of two additive terms: intrinsic consumption
utility m(k) and gain-loss utility n(k|r). Intrinsic consumption utility is analogous to the standard
notion of utility in economics, according to which preferences depend only on absolute outcomes.
We suppose that m(k) = vk1 + k2, so that the intrinsic value of the consumption good is v. Gain-
loss utility captures reference dependence and loss aversion. Its speciﬁcation incorporates two key
assumptions. First, the consumer evaluates gains and losses in the two dimensions separately. For
example, if she unexpectedly receives the good and has to pay money for it, this is assessed as a
gain in the good dimension and a loss in the money dimension (instead of, for example, a single gain
or loss depending on the net intrinsic value of the transaction).9 Second, the consumer’s sense of
gain or loss is directly related to the usefulness of the goods in question—it is more painful to lose
something we value (e.g. $100) than to lose something we do not (e.g. a paper clip). To capture
these properties, we assume that n(k|r) = µ(vk1− vr1) + µ(k2 − r2). That is, gain-loss utility in a
dimension depends in a universal way on the diﬀerence between the intrinsic utility associated with
consumption in that dimension, and the intrinsic utility that would have been derived from the
reference point. We formalize loss aversion in the simplest possible way: µ is two-piece linear, and
has a slope of 1 for gains, and a slope of λ > 1 for losses.10 Hence, the consumer is more sensitive
to losses relative to her reference point than she is to equal-sized gains over it.
In addition to the above sources of utility, the consumer experiences a shock w˜ to her willingness
to buy the good. For psychological realism and analytical tractability, we assume that the consumer
does not experience gain-loss utility in the shock w˜. While many random factors can inﬂuence
whether the consumer buys in the end, gain-loss comparisons in these variables are likely to be
much less salient and powerful than those about the good and its price, at least as far as the
decision to purchase the good are concerned. This assumption is also convenient for technical
reasons—our analysis below is made much simpler without gains and losses in this extra aspect of
9 This phenomenon is key to the endowment eﬀect and other observed regularities in riskless trades. If gains and
losses were deﬁned over the value of an entire transaction, loss aversion would have no implications for such trades.
10 In general, we would want µ to satisfy all the properties of Kahneman and Tversky’s (1979) “value function”:
continuity, convexity for losses, and concavity for gains, in addition to being kinked at zero. We focus on the case in
which µ is two-piece linear as it suﬃces to capture the eﬀects of loss aversion, our primary interest in this paper.
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utility.11
This assumption yields the following simple expression for the consumer’s utility when her
reference point is r, her consumption is k, and she experiences the shock w˜: u(k, w˜|r) ≡ m(k) +
n(k|r) + k1 · w˜. We assume that w˜ is continuously distributed on the bounded interval (a, b),
with positive density everywhere. The cumulative distribution function H is twice continuously
diﬀerentiable and H ′′ is bounded. Denote the probability density function by h.
Since we will suppose that the consumer’s reference point is her lagged probabilistic beliefs about
what she is going to get, it is crucial to extend the above speciﬁcation to allow for the reference
point to be stochastic. We assume that if the consumer’s reference point is the probability measure
Γ over {0, 1}× R, her utility is
U(k, w˜|Γ) =
∫
r
u(k, w˜|r)dΓ(r). (1)
This formulation captures, in a tractable way, the idea that in evaluating k, the consumer compares
it to each possible consumption level in the reference lottery. For example, if she expected to receive
$100 with probability one-half, getting $50 feels partly like a gain (relative to the possibility of not
getting $100) and partly like a loss (relative to the possibility of getting $100).
Having speciﬁed the consumer’s utility function, we turn to modeling her behavior. Suppose
she faces a probability distribution F of non-negative prices, and can decide whether to buy at each
price. Let σ : R+ × (a, b) → [0, 1] be her strategy, which assigns a probability of buying to each
price-shock pair. Our model of behavior is based on the premise that the consumer’s preferences,
and therefore also the strategy σ, depend on expectations she forms before she ﬁnds out the realized
price. We also believe that in most situations of interest for this paper, consumers would have at
least some ability to predict their own behavior. We capture this notion by assuming rational
expectations, positing that the consumer’s reference point is the distribution Γσ,F induced by σ
and F over consumption good-money pairs. To deal with the resulting interdependence between
11 Nevertheless, we have derived some properties of demand when the noise is also subject to gain-loss comparisons,
and the eﬀect of this on our results would depend on the exact psychological source of the uncertainty. If the
unpredictability was in the consumer’s utility from not buying the good, the eﬀects on which our results rely would
seem to strengthen. If, on the other hand, the shock was to the consumer’s valuation of the good, the same eﬀects
would seem to be weakened.
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behavior (σ) and expectations (Γσ,F ), we use the personal equilibrium concept, which requires the
strategy that generates expectations to be optimal conditional on these expectations:
Definition 1. σ : R+ × (a, b) → [0, 1] is a personal equilibrium for the price distribution F if for
all p ∈ R+, w˜ ∈ (a, b),
σ(p, w˜) ∈ argmaxs∈[0,1] s · U(1,−p, w˜|Γσ,F ) + (1− s) · U(0, 0, w˜|Γσ,F ).
Consider, for example, a consumer’s decision of whether to buy a nice stereo. Suppose for a
moment that she expects to always buy the stereo and, with these expectations determining her
preferences, there are values of w˜ for which she prefers not to buy. Then, if she can predict her own
behavior, she should not have expected to buy with probability one in the ﬁrst place. Deﬁnition
1 captures the notion that her expectations must be consistent with future behavior. See Ko˝szegi
and Rabin (2004) and Ko˝szegi (2004) for further details on this solution concept.
2.2 Market Equilibrium
Now consider the entire market game illustrated in Figure 1. Suppose the ﬁrm has to set non-
negative prices. To make our results in the next sections most striking, we suppose the ﬁrm’s
cost is continuously distributed on the interval [c, c¯], with continuous and positive density every-
where. Denote the cumulative distribution and probability density functions of c by Θ(·) and θ(·),
respectively.
In this environment, we deﬁne the ﬁrm’s pricing strategy as a function from marginal cost to
price. Clearly, any pricing strategy P : [c, c¯] → R+ chosen by the ﬁrm induces a distribution
of prices FP faced by the consumer. For a strategy σ, let σ¯(p) ≡
∫ b
a σ(p, w˜)dH(w˜); σ¯(p) is the
consumer’s probability of purchasing the good at price p.
Definition 2. The pricing strategy P (·) and the strategies σF : R+ × (a, b) → [0, 1] for all price
distributions F constitute a pricing equilibrium if
1. For any price distribution F , σF is a personal equilibrium for F .
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2. P (·) maximizes the ﬁrm’s expected proﬁts:
P ∈ argmaxPˆ (·)
∫ ∞
0
(
Pˆ (c)− c
)
· σ¯FPˆ
(
Pˆ (c)
)
dΘ(c).
A pricing equilibrium is a situation in which (1) for any pricing strategy chosen by the ﬁrm,
the consumer plays a personal equilibrium in the “continuation game”; and (2) the ﬁrm chooses an
optimal pricing distribution correctly anticipating the continuation play of the consumer.
The sole source of uncertainty that drives price changes in this model and in our analysis below
is uncertainty about marginal cost. An alternative speciﬁcation is a model where the ﬁrm has
unchanging marginal cost, but there are observable shocks to inframarginal demand. Speciﬁcally,
suppose the ﬁrm’s proﬁts at price p drawn from the price distribution F are given by p · (a˜+ σ¯F (p)),
where a˜ ≤ 0 is a random variable that shifts demand, and that is observed by the ﬁrm (such as
the state of the economy). We will argue below that our results are robust to such a change in the
source of underlying uncertainty.
2.3 The Demand Side—An Example and General Techniques
We ﬁrst consider consumer behavior in our model. To illustrate the use of our personal equilibrium
concept, and to demonstrate that it is not in general unique without a shock to the consumer’s
decision, we start with a simple multiple equilibrium example from Ko˝szegi and Rabin (2004). Let
F (·) be the deterministic price p, take v = 1, and suppose w˜ is degenerate and equal to zero. Then,
if the consumer expects to buy the good ((r1, r2) = (1,−p)), her utility from buying is 1− p, and
her utility from not buying it is p − λ. Thus, she will buy if p ≤ 1+λ2 ≡ pmax. If she expects not
to buy ((r1, r2) = (0, 0)), her utility from buying is 1− p− λp+ 1, and her utility from not buying
is zero. Thus, she does not buy if p ≥ 21+λ ≡ pmin. For p ∈ [pmin, pmax], there are thus multiple
personal equilibria.
The intuitive reason for multiple personal equilibria is simple. If the consumer expects to buy
the good, not buying is assessed as a gain in the money dimension and a loss in the good dimension.
Since the loss from not being able to consume is more painful than the gain from saving money is
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pleasant, it is optimal for her to buy. But in case she expects not to buy, it is spending money that
she considers unpleasant, so it is optimal for her not to buy.
Solving for personal equilibria with non-degenerate price and noise distributions is considerably
more complex. To identify some of the main forces that will be driving our results, suppose the
consumer expects to buy the good with probability q, and she expects the distribution of buying
price conditional on buying to be G. Then, her utility from buying at price p, combining intrinsic
utility, comparisons to other possible purchase prices, and comparisons to not buying, is
v + w˜ − p− λq
∫ p
0
(p− p′)dG(p′) + q
∫ ∞
p
(p′ − p)dG(p′) + (1− q)(v − λp). (2)
The utility from not buying is
q
[∫ ∞
0
p′dG(p′)− λv
]
, (3)
the consumer’s gain-loss utility from comparing not buying to buying. It can be rewritten as
qp + q
∫ p
0
(p′ − p)dG(p′) + q
∫ ∞
p
(p′ − p)dG(p′)− qλv. (4)
Hence, the diﬀerence in utility between buying and not buying is
v + w˜ − p + (1− q)(v − λp) + q(λv − p)− (λ− 1)q
∫ p
0
(p− p′)dG(p′). (5)
Expression 5 will be a key starting point to many of our results below. The term v + w˜ − p is the
intrinsic consumption utility associated with purchasing the good. The other terms derive from
gain-loss utility. The consumer expected to pass on the good with probability 1 − q, relative to
which buying results in a gain of the value v in the good dimension, and a loss of the price p
in the money dimension. This is captured in the term (1 − q)(v − λp). On the other hand, the
consumer expected to buy with probability q, relative to which buying avoids a loss of v and leads
to a foregone gain of p. Thus the term q(λv − p). These last two terms imply that an increase
in the consumer’s anticipated probability of buying (q) increases her “attachment” to (net utility
from buying) the good and thus her demand for it.
The last, and perhaps most interesting, term in Expression 5 captures the consumer’s sense of
loss from comparing p with lower prices she may have received under the ﬁrm’s pricing distribution.
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Contrasts with these “low-price” states induce a sensation of monetary loss in the consumer if she
buys at price p, whereas they merely reduce the gains she feels if she does not buy at price p. As
a result, this “comparison eﬀect” decreases her net utility from buying. At ﬁrst sight, it may seem
that Expression 5 should also include a term reﬂecting the consumer’s comparison between buying
at price p and buying at higher prices in the distribution. While this aﬀects the consumer’s utility,
it does not aﬀect her purchase decision of whether to buy, because it appears in her utility from
buying (Expression 2) as well as her utility from not buying (Expression 4). Intuitively, whether
or not she buys, she saves money relative to states in which the good is more expensive than p.12
Expression 5 implies that, unlike in the standard model of consumer behavior, demand at a price
p (and thus the demand curve) depends on the entire distribution F of prices. We now show how
to derive the demand curve, and give a suﬃcient condition for it to be unambiguously determined.
Based on this analysis, it will be possible to translate intuitions derived from examining Expression
5 into formal proofs of results about pricing equilibrium. Therefore, the role of the rest of this
section is to provide techniques that are necessary to follow our proofs. We also feel that these
techniques are useful for future market models with loss averse agents, and for that reason view
them as an important contribution of this paper. But they are not necessary for an intuitive
understanding of our main results.
Suppose the price distribution is F , the consumer expects to buy with probability q, and she
expects the distribution of conditional buying prices to be G. Then, her strategy is fully described
by a function wF,q,G : R+ → R, where wF,q,G(p) is deﬁned as the value of w˜ at which Expression 5
is zero: She buys the good (σF (p, w˜) = 1) if w˜ > wF,q,G(p), and does not buy it (σF (p, w˜) = 0) if
w˜ < wF,q,G(p). For this to describe a personal equilibrium strategy, it must generate expectations
12 This feature of our model depends on the linearity of µ in gains. With diminishing sensitivity, we would get the
plausible prediction that expecting to buy at higher prices increases the consumer’s demand at a given price. Buying
at a lower price than expected makes the consumer happy due to the gain she makes relative to the high price, and
because of diminishing sensitivity, she would care less about the extra gain she could make by not buying. This is
probably a real and important eﬀect, and may have some interesting consequences for pricing. But it is unlikely to
alter the results in this paper.
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consistent with q and G. Thus, a necessary and suﬃcient condition for personal equilibrium is that
q =
∫ ∞
0
(1−H(wF,q,G(p)))dF (p), and (6)
G(p) =
1
q
∫ p
0
(1−H(wF,q,G(p′)))dF (p′) ∀p. (7)
In principle, solving for wF,q,G(p) requires us to look for a ﬁxed point in a function space. Instead
of solving this more complicated problem directly, we proceed by simplifying it to a ﬁxed point
problem in the consumer’s probability of buying (q), a ﬁxed point in the reals. More speciﬁcally,
we take G out of the above ﬁxed-point problem by showing that q in itself fully determines wF,q,G.
Indeed, notice that through Expression 5, q determines wF,q,G(0) independently of G. Econom-
ically, at price p = 0, the consumer’s monetary outcome, including comparisons to other possible
prices, is the same whether or not she buys. To proceed, we exploit the property of our model
that the comparison with prices greater than p does not aﬀect the consumer’s purchase decision
at price p. Obviously, wF,q,G(p) is increasing in p. Thus, it is diﬀerentiable almost everywhere.
Diﬀerentiating 5 with respect to p and using 7 gives
∂wF,q,G
∂p
= 2+(λ−1)(1−q)+(λ−1)qG(p) = 2+(λ−1)(1−q)+(λ−1)
∫ p
0
(1−H(wF,q,G(p′)))dF (p′).
(8)
Now, using that wF,q,G(p) is continuous in p, we can conclude (by the Fundamental Theorem of
Calculus) that q determines wF,q,G entirely. Henceforth, we will thus denote the function by wF,q(·).
Intuitively, we can “build up” the function wF,q(·) using only the consumer’s overall probability of
purchase. Since only comparisons with lower prices matter for the purchasing decision, q determines
wF,q at zero and at prices “very close” to zero. Since again only comparisons with lower prices
matter, this determines wF,q at slightly higher prices also, and so on.
Equation 8 is also of non-technical interest: It implies that the price responsiveness of the
consumer’s demand at p is a continuously increasing function of the probability of purchasing at a
price less than p. In particular, demand is diﬀerentiable if p is not an atom of F , and it is kinked
if p is an atom of F and the consumer buys with positive probability at p.
Given the above simpliﬁcations, wF,q characterizes a personal equilibrium if and only if
q =
∫ ∞
0
(1−H(wF,q(p)))dF (p). (9)
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Since the right-hand side of Equation 9 deﬁnes a continuous map from [0, 1] to itself, it has a
ﬁxed point, and therefore personal equilibrium exists. The following assumption and proposition
establish that with “suﬃcient noise”, personal equilibrium is unique for any price distribution.
Assumption 1. For all w˜ ≥ −(1 + λ)v,
h(w˜) <
1
(λ− 1)
(
v + w˜+(1+λ)v2
) . (10)
Proposition 1. (Unique Demand) If Assumption 1 holds, then for any pricing distribution F ,
the personal equilibrium is unique.
Noise in the consumer’s purchase decision weakens the feedback on which the existence of
multiple equilibria hinges. Since the decision to buy depends on the realization of w˜ in addition to
expectations, a change in the anticipated probability of buying leads to a relatively small change
in the actual probability of buying. Thus, the change in expectations cannot be self-fulﬁlling.13
3 Price Stickiness and Countercyclical Pricing
We are ﬁnally ready to derive our pricing results. If q∗(F ) is the equilibrium probability of buying,
call wF,q∗(F )(p)—the w˜ at which the consumer is indiﬀerent between buying and not buying at
price p—the “critical shock” at p. To guarantee that the ﬁrm can proﬁtably sell to the consumer
with positive probability even at the highest cost, we suppose that c¯ < b+2v1+λ . And to simplify many
of our proofs, from now on we impose the following condition on H :
Assumption 2. (Regularity Condition)H satisﬁes the monotone hazard rate condition: h(w˜)1−H(w˜)
is increasing in w˜ on (a, b), and approaches ∞ as w˜ approaches b.
13 Notice that if λ increases, the right-hand side of Condition 10 decreases. Thus, we require “more noise” to
guarantee a unique equilibrium. This is natural given the above logic that multiple equilibria rely on loss aversion.
And as λ→ 1, equilibrium becomes unique even without noise.
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Assumption 2 is a technical assumption; if the consumer had no gain-loss utility, it would be
suﬃcient for the ﬁrm’s proﬁt maximization problem to be well-behaved.14
We ﬁrst establish that the ﬁrm’s maximization problem has a solution, and show that for any
optimal pricing distribution, the probability of buying is uniformly bounded away from zero.
Lemma 1. Under Assumptions 1 and 2, a pricing equilibrium exists. Moreover, there are a ≤ w ≤
w¯ < b such that for any p on the support of an optimal pricing distribution, the critical shock at p
lies on the interval [w, w¯].
We turn to presenting our ﬁrst price stickiness result. Since this form of the result is easiest to
state, in the proposition we give a global statement, conditions under which discrete pricing does
or does not obtain over the entire support of prices. But we also provide and use a local statement
(conditions for price stickiness for a range of price levels) in the text and interpretation.
Proposition 2. (Price Stickiness) Suppose Assumptions 1 and 2 hold.
Part I. If for all c ∈ [c, c¯] and all w˜ ∈ [w, w¯],
θ(c)
(
1 +
1−Θ(c)
1 + λ
)
>
(λ + 1)2
λ− 1 ·
h(w˜)
(1−H (w˜))2 , (11)
then in a pricing equilibrium, the support of the firm’s pricing distribution consists of finitely many
prices.
Part II. If for all c ∈ [c, c¯] and all w˜ ∈ [w, w¯],
θ(c)
(
1 +
1− Θ(c)
2
)
<
4
λ− 1 ·
h(w˜)
(1−H (w˜))2 ,
then in a pricing equilibrium, the firm’s pricing distribution is nonatomic.
Although our formal result is about pricing in a static model, we can interpret it in terms of the
monopolist’s price series over time. Under that interpretation, Part I means that the monopolist’s
prices jump between ﬁnitely many possible levels, with three implications. First, even though its
cost is continuously distributed, the ﬁrm does not change its price for most small cost changes.
14 That is, it guarantees that there is a solution to the ﬁrm’s pricing problem, and that the ﬁrm’s proﬁts are concave
in quantity. With no gain-loss utility, the price at which the ﬁrm sells quantity q is p(q) = H−1(1− q) + v. Thus,
p′(q) = −1h(p(q)) and p
′′(q) = h
′(p(q))p′(q)
h(p(q))2
. As q < 1, − h′(w˜)
h(w˜)2
> − qp′′(q)p′(q) .
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Second, when it does adjust the price, it does so in discrete steps, even if the cost change that
triggers the price adjustment is very small. Finally, even after the price changes, it consequently
returns to the previous level with positive probability. This last prediction is not shared by most
existing models of price stickiness.
The key force behind price stickiness is the “comparison eﬀect” resulting from the consumer’s
loss aversion in money: Her probability of buying the good at price p is negatively aﬀected by
the comparison of p to lower prices in the distribution. In particular, if the distribution of prices
were continuous, comparing p to slightly lower possible prices would decrease the consumer’s de-
mand in the region. In order to avoid this unfavorable comparison, the ﬁrm has an incentive to
“lump together” nearby prices into a single one. If this incentive outweighs the ﬁrm’s beneﬁt from
diﬀerentiating production according to cost, the price distribution is discrete.
Proposition 2 also illustrates, however, that the ﬁrm does not always want to absorb small
cost shocks. The proposition makes it clear that four factors combine to determine whether price
stickiness occurs.15 First, the ﬁrm’s cost distribution needs to be “suﬃciently dense” (i.e. the
environment has to be stable enough) for the price distribution to be discrete. If the cost is highly
variable, in the optimal pricing strategy the probability that the price is within a narrow range is
small. Thus, comparisons between prices in these states play a relatively small role in determining
the consumer’s overall sensation of loss in money. As a result, the ﬁrm does not beneﬁt as much
from lumping together nearby prices, and so chooses to diﬀerentiate production according to cost.
Second, the ﬁrm’s tendency to set sticky prices depends on the consumer’s loss aversion, mea-
sured by λ. As the buyer’s loss aversion disappears (λ → 1), the ﬁrm sets a non-atomic price
distribution in equilibrium. Intuitively, if the consumer does not ﬁnd losses very painful, the com-
parison eﬀect has little impact on her demand, so the ﬁrm does not beneﬁt much from eliminating
local comparisons. For non-trivial loss aversion, Condition 11 is more likely to be satisﬁed, re-
ﬂecting the ﬁrm’s increased incentive to absorb small cost shocks. Our conditions, however, leave
substantial ambiguity as to whether price stickiness occurs for high λ’s. The reason is that an
15 The arguments below on the properties of the model as a function of Θ and λ are not completely precise, because
changes in the parameters in general change w and w¯. It is easy to show that w and w¯ can be chosen so that the
statements hold.
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increase in λ not only increases the ﬁrm’s revenue-side incentive to absorb small cost shocks, it
also increases its production-side costs of doing so,16 and neither eﬀect seems to systematically
dominate for large λ. But this comparative static is the least important, as in practice there are
unlikely to be many exogenous variations in λ across situations.
To interpret the other determinants of price stickiness, we provide a local analogue of Condition
11 in terms of the properties of the agent’s equilibrium demand curve (which depends on F ). Let
DF (p) ≡ 1−H(wF,q∗(F )(p)).
Consider an interval (p1, p2) of an optimal pricing distribution F , and let [c1, c2] be the closure
of the costs corresponding to prices in (p1, p2). By the same argument as in the proof of Proposition
2, if for all p ∈ (p1, p2), c ∈ [c1, c2],
(λ− 1)DF (p)
λ+ 1
·
(
1 +
1− F (p)
λ+ 1
)
>
1
θ(c)
· D
′
F (p)
DF (p)
(12)
whenever D′F (p) exists, then the pricing distribution on (p1, p2) is discrete.
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Third, then, whether the ﬁrm chooses to absorb small cost shocks depends on the consumer’s
demand DF (p) (the probability with which she buys the good). If she is very unlikely to buy, her
gain-loss utility from buying it is dominated by comparing this to not buying, and not by comparing
the price to other possible purchase prices. Thus, the monopolist gains little from oﬀering the same
price for nearby cost levels.
Crucially, this comparative static depends on an individual consumer’s frequency of purchase,
not the overall frequency of purchase in the population. We can distinguish two kinds of ﬁrms. One
ﬁrm has a small costumer base of people who buy relatively frequently. The other ﬁrm sells the
same amount overall, but to a larger population who buy less frequently. According to our model,
the former ﬁrm would have a greater incentive to absorb small cost shocks.
16 As λ increases, the elasticity of demand typically also increases, as the consumer becomes more sensitive to losses
in the money dimension. Thus, as explained below, the ﬁrm beneﬁts more from diﬀerentiating production according
to marginal cost.
17 The condition for the pricing distribution to be nonatomic on (p1, p2) is
(λ− 1)DF (p)
2
·
(
1 +
1− F (p)
2
)
<
1
θ(c)
· D
′
F (p)
DF (p)
.
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Fourth, the ﬁrm is more likely to absorb small cost changes if the consumer’s proportional
responsiveness to prices—as measured by D
′
F (p)
DF (p)
—is small. If consumers are very responsive to
price changes, the ﬁrm can diﬀerentiate production levels in diﬀerent states of the world without
charging very diﬀerent prices in them. Price comparisons being small, the cost saving comes with
little impact on the revenue side.
An interesting consequence of Condition 12 is that price stickiness is more likely to occur in
regions where the price is more likely to fall. That the price is often in a given region is an indication
that the cost distribution is quite dense there (θ(c) is high), making it more likely that the condition
is satisﬁed. Loosely speaking, this means that if many price realizations are observed in a region
of possible prices, the price is unlikely to fall there. Paradoxically, the price more often falls in a
region where only a single isolated price has been observed.
Condition 12 also includes the term 1 + 1−F (p)λ+1 , indicating that price stickiness is more likely
to occur in the lower part of the price distribution. Absorbing small cost shocks allows the ﬁrm
to raise its average price while holding demand constant. This exerts a positive “externality” on
proﬁts in higher-price states, because it decreases the comparison eﬀect in those states. And the
lower the current price is in the distribution, the more important is this externality eﬀect.
The same intuitions for price stickiness apply to the alternative speciﬁcation of our model in
which the underlying uncertainty is about the amount of inframarginal demand. The ﬁrm increases
revenues from the marginal consumer by lumping prices together into atoms. Lumping these prices
together, however, comes at the cost of decreasing revenues from inframarginal consumers, because
there is a beneﬁt from charging higher prices for higher demand realizations.
Even in circumstances where the ﬁrm does not absorb small cost shocks, its price distribution is
systematically diﬀerent from that of a ﬁrm facing standard consumers. Of course, since a standard
ﬁrm faces consumers who have diﬀerent preferences, it is not immediately clear how to make such
a comparison. But there is a natural way to do it using market observables. The equilibrium
demand function DF (·) is (at least in principle) observable, and if F is continuously distributed, it
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is diﬀerentiable. A classical ﬁrm facing this demand function would solve
max
p
(p− c)DF (p)
for any c. We can write the ﬁrst-order condition for the optimal price at cost c as (p − c) +
[DF (p)/D′F(p)] = 0. When consumers are loss averse, price varies less with cost in the following
sense:
Proposition 3. (Countercyclical Markups) Suppose Assumptions 1 and 2 hold. In a pricing
equilibrium with a nonatomic price distribution, (p − c) + [DF (p)/D′F (p)] is strictly decreasing in
c.
The intuition for this result derives from a variant of the “externality” eﬀect we have discussed
above. The ﬁrm’s temptation to decrease prices and reap higher proﬁts at lower cost realizations
is constrained by the concern that a low price forms the basis for an unfavorable comparison when
the consumer sees a higher price. In other words, lowering the price for a low cost may increase
proﬁts in that state of the world, but it decreases demand in the states when the ﬁrm needs to
charge higher prices. And the lower is a cost realization, the more likely that the ﬁrm would want
to charge higher prices at other times, so the less aggressively it wants to cut prices.
This intuition, however, ignores another kind of externality that aﬀects the ﬁrm’s price distri-
bution. By increasing demand at any price, the monopolist increases the consumer’s anticipated
probability of buying, increasing her “attachment” to the good and therefore demand at all other
prices. The above logic is correct only once this consideration is held constant, giving rise to the
speciﬁc expression in Proposition 3. The expression is equivalent to − (p−c)D′F (p)+DF (p)−D′F (p) , the ﬁrm’s
marginal proﬁt from decreasing the price, discounted by the eﬀect of the change in price on demand.
Using the empirical observation that marginal costs move procyclically (Bils 1987), a natural
interpretation of the above proposition is that the ﬁrm’s prices follow a more countercyclical pattern
than those of a monopolist facing standard consumers. But the exact same intuition suggests that
this result also obtains in the variant of our model in which the underlying uncertainty is about
the amount of inframarginal demand. Thus, our model predicts a tendency towards countercyclical
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Figure 3: Timing without Commitment
markups whether or not business cycles originate in cost or demand shocks.18
Although Proposition 3 is stated for continuous price distributions, an appropriate analogous
statement is true in cases when the ﬁrm sets a ﬁnite set of prices. In that case, however, the
equilibrium demand curve is kinked, so the derivatives used to deﬁne the price elasticity do not
exist everywhere. The proposition remains true if the derivative D′F (p) in the deﬁnition of the
elasticity is replaced by the left derivative, and the cost at a kink is replaced by the average cost.
4 The Role of Commitment and the Optimal Price
Our formal analysis so far has assumed that the ﬁrm can commit to a pricing strategy before
observing its cost realization. This framework applies mostly to ﬁrms that are in the market for
the long run and therefore “invest” in inﬂuencing consumer expectations. If either the ﬁrm heavily
discounts future proﬁts, or consumers do not use past prices to update beliefs, the monopolist has
no incentive to invest in changing expectations. Therefore, we now look at market outcomes when
the ﬁrm is unable to commit to a price distribution, and instead chooses its price after observing
its cost, and after the consumer has formed expectations about market prices and her behavior.
The timing of the new game is illustrated in Figure 3. The consumer ﬁrst forms expectations
about market prices and her own behavior in response to those prices. Then, the ﬁrm observes its
cost and chooses its price. Finally, the consumer observes w˜ and decides whether or not to buy the
18 This discussion ignores some serious conceptual issues in connecting our model to macroeconomic settings. First,
an open issue is whether loss aversion should be deﬁned over real or nominal prices. Second, if booms and recessions
aﬀect gain-loss utility—e.g. if wealth changes associated with a boom mitigate potential losses—business cycles
cannot fully be modeled as changes in marginal cost or inframarginal demand. Addressing these and other issues is
beyond the scope of the current paper.
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good. A pricing equilibrium is deﬁned as a situation where (1) for each c, the ﬁrm maximizes proﬁts,
given the consumer’s expectations; and (2) the consumer correctly anticipates the distribution of
prices, and plays a personal equilibrium for that distribution.
We ﬁrst establish that equilibrium exists in this version of our model.
Lemma 2. Under Assumptions 1 and 2, a pricing equilibrium exists in the no-commitment model.
If Assumption 2 holds, then in any pricing equilibrium, there are a ≤ w ≤ w¯ < b such that for any
p on the support of the pricing distribution, the critical shock at p lies on the interval [w, w¯].
It is easy to see that even without commitment, it can be in the ﬁrm’s interest to absorb small
cost shocks. Suppose that the consumer expects the ﬁrm to charge price p with probability one,
and let the personal equilibrium probability of purchase with this expectation be q∗(p). Then,
using Expression 5 to express the ﬁrm’s proﬁt maximization problem, if
1−H(wp,q∗(p)(p))
h(wp,q∗(p)(p)) · (2 + (λ− 1))
≤ p− c ≤ 1−H(wp,q∗(p)(p))
h(wp,q∗(p)(p)) · (2 + (1− q∗(p))(λ− 1))
(13)
for all c ∈ [c, c¯], the ﬁrm charges price p for all cost realizations. Intuitively, if the consumer expects
to see the price p when she gets to the store, she experiences a loss if the price (to her surprise)
turns out to be greater than p, making demand more sensitive to increases in the price than to
decreases of it. With such a kink in the demand function, for a range of cost levels p becomes the
optimal price for the monopolist to charge.
This logic also indicates that if there is a deterministic-price pricing equilibrium, there are
typically multiple ones. In fact, the set of possible equilibrium price levels is a closed interval.19
The lack of commitment reintroduces multiple equilibria into our model, because a kinked demand
curve creates an incentive for the ﬁrm to “comply” with the consumer’s expectations—expectations
she forms without observing a pricing policy.
Although the above argument demonstrates that the ﬁrm may have an incentive to set sticky
prices even without commitment, it may seem that there should also be equilibria with random
19 To see this, ﬁrst note that q∗(p) is decreasing in p and wp,q∗(p)(p) is increasing in it, and both are continuous.
Together with Assumption 2, this implies that both the left-hand side and right-hand side in Condition 13 are
decreasing and continuous in p. Since p − c is increasing and continuous in p, the set of prices for which Condition
13 is satisﬁed must be a closed interval.
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pricing. If the consumer expects the ﬁrm to charge diﬀerent prices for diﬀerent cost realizations,
there is (by Equation 8) no kink in her demand function. Then, a proﬁt-maximizing ﬁrm does in
fact charge diﬀerent prices for diﬀerent cost realizations. Nevertheless, the following proposition
shows that if the cost distribution is dense, there are only deterministic-price pricing equilibria.
Proposition 4. (Price Stickiness without Commitment) Suppose Assumption 2 holds.
Part I. If for all c ∈ [c, c¯] and w˜ ∈ [w, w¯],
θ(c) >
(λ + 1)2
λ− 1 ·
h(w˜)
(1−H(w˜))2 ,
then in any pricing equilibrium, the firm’s price is deterministic.
Part II. If for all c ∈ [c, c¯] and w˜ ∈ [w, w¯],
θ(c) <
4
λ− 1 ·
h(w˜)
(1−H(w˜))2 ,
then in any pricing equilibrium, the firm’s prices are non-atomic.
Strikingly, even without commitment, and even though there are generally a continuum of
equilibria in this case, with a suﬃciently dense cost distribution the ﬁrm sets a deterministic price.
The intuition for this result is easiest to see by ﬁrst assuming that the consumer expects the ﬁrm’s
prices to be continuously distributed. Recall that the consumer’s demand is negatively aﬀected by
comparisons to lower prices. The higher the price, the more she compares this price to lower prices
and, thus, the greater is the reduction in her demand in response to a price increase. Hence, the
ﬁrm’s demand curve is relatively inelastic for prices lower than the range of prices the consumer
expects, but then becomes more elastic as we move through the price distribution. Because of
this, a ﬁrm with a suﬃciently dense cost distribution oﬀers a narrower price distribution than the
consumer expects (although this price distribution is still continuous). But if it is this denser price
distribution that the consumer expects, her demand function becomes elastic more quickly. The
ﬁrm responds to this by choosing an even more condensed price distribution, and so on ... the
equilibrium collapses to a single point.
Our model thus endogenously generates a market with a kinked demand curve. It bears em-
phasizing that our theory does not assume a kinked demand curve from the start, but instead
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derives it endogenously as a property of market equilibrium. As we have mentioned, if consumers
expected the ﬁrm to charge diﬀerent prices for diﬀerent cost realizations, then the ﬁrm’s demand
function would be a smooth one. Neither is the kink in demand a straight-forward consequence
of reference-dependent models in general. For example, if there is a continuum of consumers with
diﬀerent reference points, the aggregate demand curve is again smooth, although individual ones
are not. The assumption that expectations are the reference point, together with the equilibrium
conditions, yields a deterministic price and creates a kink in demand.
The conditions for price stickiness in Proposition 4 are very similar to those in Proposition 2,
but do not include a term with 1 − Θ(c). The reason is that without commitment, there is no
“externality eﬀect”: For any given cost realization, the ﬁrm ignores the eﬀect of its pricing decision
on demand in other states of the world. All our other comparative statics results, however, continue
to hold. Namely, price stickiness is more likely to occur when the cost distribution has high density,
for goods that the consumer buys with higher probability, and for more elastic goods. Furthermore,
these comparative statics statements hold globally as well as locally.
An interesting diﬀerence between Propositions 2 and 4, however, is that the latter does not re-
quire uniqueness of personal equilibrium (Assumption 1). In Proposition 2, uniqueness is necessary
so that changes in the ﬁrm’s pricing distribution do not induce jumps in the personal equilibrium
played by the consumer. In the current model, the ﬁrm chooses its price after the consumer has
formed expectations, so such jumps cannot occur.
To summarize, the ﬁrm has similar incentives to stabilize the price with and without commit-
ment. Since the ﬁrm in the no-commitment model is assumed to maximize its proﬁt given the
(equilibrium) market demand curve, however, there is no analogue to Proposition 3. Therefore, we
predict that long-run ﬁrms have more countercyclical markups than short-run ones. In addition,
the commitment and no-commitment models are in general diﬀerent in the price levels they gen-
erate. When the price is deterministic with and without commitment, there is an unambiguous
relationship between the two price levels.
Proposition 5. (Price Comparison) Suppose Assumptions 1 and 2 hold. If the deterministic
price pc is charged in a pricing equilibrium with commitment, and the deterministic price pnc is
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charged in a pricing equilibrium without commitment, then pc < pnc.
The proof of Proposition 5 proceeds by showing that if the consumer expects to be oﬀered
the price pc with probability one, a non-committed ﬁrm prefers to charge a higher price. This is
equivalent to showing that the ﬁrm’s incentive to raise the price above pc is lower under commitment
than under no commitment. An anticipated price increase deﬂates the probability with which the
consumer expects to buy, decreasing her loss in the good dimension if she does not buy, and
increasing her loss in the money dimension if she does. This feedback of behavior into expectations
decreases the buyer’s “attachment” to the good and thus her demand. Since without commitment,
the ﬁrm does not take such feedback into account, it sets a higher price in that case.
While this intuition for Proposition 5 may seem straightforward, there is actually an eﬀect
running in the opposite direction. If a non-committed ﬁrm surprises the consumer by raising the
price above pc, the resulting unfavorable comparison decreases her demand. The same problem does
not arise when the ﬁrm commits to a higher price, because in that case the consumer will not be
unpleasantly surprised by it. For a small surprise price increase, the consumer’s loss depends on the
purchase probability, i.e. her inframarginal demand. Recall that by committing to a slightly higher
price, however, the ﬁrm induces a marginal reduction in demand and relative to the lost demand
states, buying now induces a loss of pc in the money dimension and does not avoid a loss of v in
the good dimension; the above attachment eﬀect thus depends on the marginal demand reduction
times pc + v. At the optimal commitment price of the monopolist, inframarginal demand is equal
to the reduction in marginal demand times the average markup, which implies that inframarginal
demand is less than the reduction in marginal demand times pc + v. Hence the attachment eﬀect
dominates, and without commitment the monopolist prefers to raise the price. By a similar logic,
the same is true in general for the highest price in the ﬁrm’s price distribution.20
Proposition 5 has two potentially important testable implications. First, a ﬁrm that “invests” in
20 But since lower prices in non-deterministic price distributions aﬀect comparisons the consumer draws at higher
prices, this does not imply an analogue to Proposition 5 for such distributions. Suppose the ﬁrm sets non-deterministic
prices, and consider its pricing decision for cost c. With commitment, the ﬁrm takes into account that the price it
sets for c will form a basis for comparison at higher prices. This leads to an incentive to increase prices at low costs
that acts against the eﬀect above. If this eﬀect is strong enough, it increases demand at higher prices, allowing it to
charge higher prices in those states as well.
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inﬂuencing consumer expectations sets a lower price than one that cannot inﬂuence expectations.
Second, since a ﬁrm under commitment could increase proﬁts ex post from raising the highest
price in its pricing distribution, it underprices at the top: Given the equilibrium demand curve, the
highest price it chooses would appear (to an observer assuming that consumers are classical) to be
below the proﬁt maximizing price.
5 The “Attachment Eﬀect” and Promotional Sales
Recall the example introduced in Section 2.3, which illustrates that absent a shock to the consumer’s
willingness to buy, a basic consequence of our model is the possibility of multiple personal equilibria
for a given pricing distribution. We now consider the implications of multiple personal equilibria
for pricing equilibria, because we believe it suggests an important novel eﬀect for optimal pricing.
We focus on a model in which the consumer’s willingness to buy is not subject to a shock, v = 1, c
is deterministic, and the ﬁrm can commit to a pricing distribution. For a moment, suppose the ﬁrm
is restricted to charge deterministic prices. Then, for any p ∈ [pmin, pmax] for which p ≥ c, it would
be a pricing equilibrium for the ﬁrm to charge price p and the consumer to buy at prices p′ ≤ p.
This suggests that the consumer’s loss aversion signiﬁcantly hurts the ﬁrm if she is predisposed
to not buying, but it signiﬁcantly beneﬁts the ﬁrm if she is predisposed to buying. This simple
intuition, however, is partially misleading if the monopolist can oﬀer random prices.
To understand the central idea, suppose the consumer would not buy the good for any deter-
ministic price above pmin. Then, it is not optimal for the ﬁrm to oﬀer a deterministic price. In
particular, consider setting p = pmin −  and p = pmin + 2 with probability one-half each. By our
calculation in Section 2.3, it is not a personal equilibrium for the consumer to buy with probability
zero; if she expected to do so, she would still prefer to buy at the lower price. But for a suﬃciently
small , neither is it an equilibrium for her to buy only at the low price: If she expected to do so,
her utility from buying at the high price would be 1 − (pmin + 2) − 32λ + 12 (1 − λ(pmin + 2)),
which is greater than 12 (pmin− − λ), her utility from not buying. Thus, the unique equilibrium is
for her to buy at both prices, for an expected revenue over pmin.
Intuitively, by oﬀering a suﬃciently low price with some probability, the ﬁrm makes sure that
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the consumer buys the good at least in that state of the world, and—through the resulting increase
in her anticipated probability of buying—increases her willingness to pay. The ﬁrm takes advantage
of this “attachment eﬀect” by sometimes setting a higher price. The above pricing policy, however,
is far from the best the ﬁrm can do.
Proposition 6. (Sales and Minimum Profits) Suppose H is degenerate and c is deterministic,
and that the firm can commit to a pricing strategy. The lowest possible expected profit the firm can
earn in a pricing equilibrium is max {0, π(λ)− c}, where
π(λ) =
(
exp
(
λ− 1
λ+ 1
)
− 1
)
· 3 + λ
λ− 1 − 1. (14)
When the consumer systematically plays the worst possible continuation equilibrium—which
is when the monopolist earns lowest proﬁts—the ﬁrm wants to commit to a pricing distribution
for which the unique personal equilibrium is to buy the good with probability one. Furthermore,
it prefers to “just unravel” any other personal equilibrium: For any price p on the support of the
distribution, if the consumer expected to buy the good for prices below p, she should (barely)
be willing to buy it at price p. This yields a diﬀerential equation at the heart of the proof of
Proposition 6.
The ﬁrm’s minimum expected proﬁts for c = 0 are illustrated in Figure 4 as a function of λ. As
is clear from the ﬁgure, the guaranteed expected proﬁt is decreasing in λ. If the consumer is more
loss averse, it becomes more diﬃcult to counteract her tendency to play the “unfavorable” personal
equilibrium, decreasing the lower bound on proﬁts. However, the bound decreases quite slowly in
λ. For λ = 3—a parameter value implied by the 2:1 loss aversion suggested by the experimental
evidence—expected proﬁts are still about 0.95, even though for those preferences pmin = 12 . Thus,
the ﬁrm goes a long way in eliminating the consumer’s predisposition not to buy, and makes proﬁts
close to her intrinsic valuation of the good.
Surprisingly, even as the consumer becomes inﬁnitely loss averse (λ → ∞), the ﬁrm cannot
make expected proﬁts less than e − 2 ≈ 0.72. Since the consumer’s sense of loss from paying any
positive amount when she was not expecting to do so becomes inﬁnitely large, it would seem that
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Figure 4: The Firm’s Proﬁts in the Worst-Case Scenario for c = 0
with an unfavorable equilibrium selection, the ﬁrm should not be able to make any proﬁts. But as
the consumer’s loss aversion increases, so does the strength of the attachment eﬀect on which the
ﬁrm’s pricing strategy relies: Any sale-induced increase in her anticipated probability of buying has
a large eﬀect on her willingness to pay for the good. Thus, the ﬁrm’s minimum expected proﬁts
remain bounded far away from zero, even as the best possible proﬁts increase without limit.
Proposition 6 therefore implies that the expected proﬁt the ﬁrm can guarantee itself with the
possibility to oﬀer random sales is much higher than the proﬁts it can be certain of without sales.
In other words, sales play a crucial role in determining the range of market outcomes possible with
loss averse consumers. But neither Proposition 6, nor our theory, can make precise predictions on
how often sales will actually be observed in equilibrium.
Arguably, however, it is psychologically reasonable for consumers to go about their lives play-
ing a no-purchase personal equilibrium for many products, whenever such equilibrium exists. In
these circumstances, sales will be observed in pricing equilibrium, with some interesting economic
interpretations. First, occasional sales in this equilibrium not only boost immediate demand, they
also increase consumers’ willingness to buy at higher prices. Thus, such sales can be interpreted
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as an investment into future market size. This view makes it clear that only a patient ﬁrm should
care to oﬀer random sales; indeed, in the no-commitment version of our model, random prices
would not be observed with deterministic costs. Second, note that if π(λ) > c > pmin, the ﬁrm
earns positive proﬁts in equilibrium. More interestingly, it sets the price below marginal cost with
positive probability. Therefore, this equilibrium provides a non-competitive market reason for what
would in a standard setting be interpreted as predatory pricing.
Nevertheless, a drawback of the model without shocks, and the reason we have not employed
it in earlier sections, is that there is little we can deﬁnitively say about the ﬁrm’s strategy in a
pricing equilibrium. Using Proposition 6, a pricing policy F is sustainable in an equilibrium if and
only if there is a continuation personal equilibrium that yields proﬁts π ≥ {π(λ)− c, 0}.21 As a
result, a wide range of equilibrium proﬁt levels are possible, and most proﬁt levels can result from
both deterministic and random prices.22 But many of the possible pricing equilibria can only be
supported by making rather ad hoc assumptions about how the pricing distribution aﬀects the
consumer’s selection between personal equilibria, raising the concern that any results we reach
would be driven by these selection rules.
6 Related Literature
The understanding of strategic pricing behavior is a central theme in industrial organization. Within
this theme, our paper is related to the extensive work on price rigidity, collusion, countercyclical
markups, kinked demand curves, and sales. Our results regarding price rigidity and countercyclical
markups also have important implications for other ﬁelds of economics, such as macroeconomics.23
We brieﬂy discuss empirical evidence relating to our model and the connection of our theory
to earlier work on the above topics. One diﬀerence between our framework and many previous
theories is that our results are driven by the demand side, rather than by strategic interactions
21 A simple way to support such an F is the following. If the ﬁrm commits to the pricing distribution F , the
consumer plays the personal equilibrium that yields proﬁts π. If the ﬁrm chooses any other price distribution, the
consumer plays the lowest-proﬁt personal equilibrium.
22 For example, for λ = 3 and c = 0, anything in the (approximate) interval [0.95, 2] is an equilibrium proﬁt level.
23 For example, Stiglitz (1984) writes “[c]onventional wisdom has it that a large part of the explanation of Keynesian
unemployment is the observed rigidity of wages and prices.”
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(competition or collusion) between oligopolistic ﬁrms. As such, we obtain our results even in a
monopoly setting.24 More importantly, a major advantage of our theory over others is that it
explains multiple pricing phenomena under a single umbrella.
At the core of our theory is consumer loss aversion. In addition to the experimental and ﬁeld
research mentioned in the introduction, further evidence on the importance of reference eﬀects
and loss aversion in market settings is provided in the marketing literature. Consumers seem
to compare observed prices to “reference prices” determined at least partly by “price beliefs” or
expectations (Erickson and Johansson 1985, Kalwani and Yim 1992, Winer 1986), and purchases
are more sensitive to losses from the reference price than to gains relative to it. Hardie, Johnson,
and Fader (1993) ﬁnd evidence of loss aversion in evaluations of quality as well.
We now turn to evidence relating to the predictions of our model. Chevalier, Kashyap and Rossi
(2000) investigate the pricing behavior of a large supermarket chain in Chicago, and ﬁnd that most
price series are characterized by only a few prices over a ﬁve-year horizon. A typical series is that
of 9.5 ounce Triscuit crackers, which features only eight “regular prices” over 7.5 years. They also
ﬁnd overwhelming evidence of temporary sales: The price drops for a short period of time, after
which it returns to its original level.
These ﬁndings are consistent with our price stickiness result. In contrast, it seems hard to
explain them based on menu or ﬁxed adjustment costs. When the ﬁrm chooses a price at the end
of a sale, it incurs the menu cost anyhow and should move the price to the new optimal level. It
seems implausible that this level is identical before and after each of the many sales.25
Cross sectional empirical work by Mills (1927), Means (1935), and Carlton (1986, 1989) indicate
that prices are less volatile in more concentrated industries. As Carlton (1989) points out, there is
a widespread informal view that the lack of price movement in concentrated industries is the result
24 Price discriminating sales can also arise in a monopoly setting with standard consumers. See our discussion
below.
25 Similarly, Kashyap (1995) ﬁnds that prices in retail catalogs often remain constant for years, even though new
catalogs are designed and printed every six months. Once again, since the retailer prints a new catalog anyway, it
incurs no menu costs for changing the price in response to (presumably) at least slightly diﬀerent circumstances.
In studying the prices of saltine crackers, Slade (1999) also ﬁnds evidence of price stickiness, as well as an eﬀect of
“goodwill”, that low past prices increase current sales. Our model provides an endogenous rationale for the goodwill-
eﬀect present in her data: Sales increase the consumer’s expectation of buying the good and thereby increase demand
in higher-price states of the world.
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of collusive behavior. The idea is that ﬁrms avoid changing prices, lest this be “misinterpreted” by
other ﬁrms and lead to a price war. Athey, Bagwell and Sanchirico (2004) show that this intuition
holds in the optimal symmetric collusive equilibria of a repeated game in which ﬁrms have private
cost shocks.26 If ﬁrms’ current behavior, however, can depend on past market shares, there exist
more eﬃcient collusive equilibria without price stickiness.27
Rotemberg and Saloner (1986) study the eﬀect of demand shocks on markups of colluding
ﬁrms. During a “boom” potential short run proﬁts are high, increasing the temptation to defect
from the long run optimal collusive strategy. As a result, markups must be countercyclical. In
Rotemberg and Saloner’s model, an increase in the demand intercept has the same eﬀect as a
decrease in marginal cost. Empirical evidence suggests that marginal costs move procyclically (e.g.
Bils 1987) so for industries in which demand is relatively stable over the business cycle, they in fact
predict procyclical markups. In contrast, our model predicts countercyclical markups independent
of whether the business cycle originates in cost or demand shocks.
Chevalier and Scharfstein (1996) develop an explanation for countercyclical markups based on
capital market imperfections and the assumption that low current prices serve as market share
investments because customers have to pay a cost when switching between sellers.28 In a recession
the default risk is higher, leading to lower investments and higher prices. Our model can be viewed
as providing a psychological foundation for switching costs, since expecting to buy a good makes
it painful not to buy it. In contrast to their model, however, we predict countercyclical markups
for ﬁrms whose ﬁnancial constraints do not change over the business cycle.29
Our model is also related to an older literature on kinked demand curves (Hall and Hitch
26 If ﬁrms responded to their respective cost positions, high cost ﬁrms would have to be prevented from setting
the low cost ﬁrms’ equilibrium price through a loss in continuation value when lower prices are set. With symmetric
strategies in each period, this must entail an increase in the likelihood of a price war. Thus, in the optimal collusive
equilibrium, rigid prices may prevail.
27 In the optimal collusive equilibrium, low prices and high market shares today lead to lower equilibrium market
shares in the future. Athey and Bagwell (2001) and Aoyagi (2002) show this in collusive models with explicit
communication. Skrzypacz and Hopenhayn (2004), Blume and Heidhues (2002, 2003), and Ho¨rner and Jamison
(2004) show that the same insight holds in repeated auction environments with limited observability and no explicit
communication.
28 Klemperer (1995) discusses under what conditions switching costs lead to countercyclical markups.
29 Nevertheless, more myopic ﬁrms (possibly due to ﬁnancial distress) have a tendency to set higher prices in our
model than patient ones (Proposition 5), as Chevalier and Scharfstein’s (1996) empirical evidence indicates. There
is also evidence for an implication of Proposition 5, that ﬁrms underprice (Hoch, Dre´ze, and Purk 1994).
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1939, Sweezy 1939). In these models, each ﬁrm believes that if it lowers its price, rivals will do the
same, while if it increases its price, rivals will not follow—leading to a kinked demand curve. Maskin
and Tirole (1988) provide a game-theoretic foundation for these beliefs in a repeated alternating-
move pricing game, but do not investigate the impact of cost shocks on pricing behavior.
There is also a considerable industrial-organization literature investigating why ﬁrms engage
in sales or promotions—that is, vary prices across locations or time even when demand and cost
conditions are similar. The literature developed two common rationales for sales. In one set of
models, the oligopolistic environment leads ﬁrms to play mixed strategies.30 Other models focus on
ﬁrms’ incentives to price discriminate between groups of consumers.31 In contrast to this literature,
in our model of Section 5 the existence of low prices (weakly) increases demand in high price states.
Our paper belongs to a small literature—sometimes called “behavioral IO”—that investigates
the impact of psychological regularities in consumer behavior on the strategic choices of ﬁrms and
the functioning of markets.32
Closely related is also Rotemberg (2002) who develops a model in which consumers are only
willing to buy from altruistic ﬁrms. Whenever a ﬁrm changes its price, consumers use subjective
beliefs to reevaluate whether the ﬁrm adheres to altruistic pricing. This leads to price rigidity, as
the ﬁrm is reluctant to change its price. Rotemberg (2002) discusses the implications of his model
for the frequency of price changes and optimal monetary policy, while Rotemberg (2004) focuses
on its implications for strategic pricing.
7 Conclusion
Loss aversion is one of the most well-documented traits of human preferences. It has been observed
in a variety of experimental situations, including monetary gambles and the risky or riskless buying,
selling, and exchange of goods. It also aﬀects three of the most important economic markets,
residential housing markets (Genesove and Mayer 2001), labor markets (Bewley 1998), and ﬁnancial
30 See, for example, Shilony (1977), Varian (1980) and Gal-Or (1982).
31 See, for example, Salop (1977), Salop and Stiglitz (1982), Conlisk, Gerstner and Sobel (1984), and Sobel (1984,
1991).
32 On hyperbolic discounting and ﬁrm behavior, see DellaVigna and Malmendier (2004) and Nocke and Peitz
(2003); on consumer confusion and competition, see Gabaix and Laibson (2004a, 2004b).
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markets (Odean 1998). Finally, it has been argued theoretically that much of the observed avoidance
of risk should be attributed to loss aversion (Rabin 2000, Barberis, Huang, and Thaler 2003).
Despite this large and growing literature on loss aversion, the implications of the phenomenon
for major market outcomes (outside ﬁnance) have not been investigated. Our paper attempts
to start ﬁlling this gap. Based on Ko˝szegi and Rabin (2004), we develop a model of consumer
behavior with loss aversion, a model that we believe transfers to many possible settings. We embed
these consumers in a marketplace with a monopolistic seller operating in a partially unpredictable
economic environment. Based on just two basic and intuitive consequences of expectations-based
loss aversion, we derive a rich set of implications for the monopolist’s pricing strategy. First, if the
price distribution is stochastic, the consumer experiences a loss from paying a higher price than
others she could have received. This comparison eﬀect can yield to (among other regularities) price
stickiness and countercyclical markups. Second, the consumer’s expectation to acquire the good
with a high probability increases her willingness to pay for it. This implies that even a ﬁrm with
a deterministic cost may oﬀer random sales to get consumers used to the idea of buying.
One natural extension of this paper is to analyze the impact of loss-averse consumers on the
pricing of a multi-product monopolist such as a supermarket. If consumers isolate each of their
individual purchases from the others, the single-good model we have developed still applies to
these sellers. However, if (as may sometimes be plausible to assume) consumers budget some joint
purchases together, the analysis changes because the ﬁrm might choose to correlate prices across
goods. Another natural extension is to analyze the impact of loss averse consumers on pricing in
oligopoly environments. At ﬁrst blush, it may seem that competition mitigates the phenomena we
have identiﬁed in this paper, because oligopolists will be more worried about outcompeting each
other than about responding optimally to consumers’ loss aversion. While this may be true with
perfect competition, in an imperfectly competitive environment loss aversion also aﬀects how the
ﬁrms compete. For example, a ﬁrm does not want to ask for higher prices than its competitors if
that creates a sense of loss in its potential consumers. Thus, ﬁrms may use consumer loss aversion
as a competitive weapon.
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A Proofs
Proof of Proposition 1.
We prove that if h satisﬁes the condition 10, the function q 
→ ∫∞0 (1− H(wF,q(p)))dF (p) has
slope less than 1. Take any q, q′ ∈ [0, 1] with q > q′. Then, using Equation 5, wF,q′(0)− wF,q(0) =
v(λ− 1)(q− q′). Using Equation 8, (in the following we use the right hand side limit whenever the
derivative is not deﬁned at p) one has
∂wF,q′(p)
∂p
−∂wF,q(p)
∂p
= (λ−1)
{
(q − q′)−
∫ p
0
(1−H(wF,q(p′)))dF (p′) +
∫ p
0
(1−H(wF,q′(p′)))dF (p′)
}
.
Now we prove by contradiction that 0 < wF,q′(p)− wF,q(p) ≤ (λ− 1)(q − q′)(v + p) for all p ≥ 0.
Suppose by contradiction that this is not true, and let p¯ be the least upper bound of prices p for
which it is true. Using that wF,q(p), wF,q′(p) ≥ 2p− (1 + λ)v, and the condition on h, this implies
that (1−H(wF,q(p)))− (1−H(wF,q′(p))) < q − q′ for all prices p ≤ p¯. But then clearly
0 <
∂wF,q′(p)
∂p
− ∂wF,q(p)
∂p
≤ (λ− 1)(q − q′)
for all p ≤ p¯. Furthermore, since wF,q′(p¯)− wF,q(p¯) ≥ 0 and ∂wF,q′ (p¯)∂p −
∂wF,q(p¯)
∂p > 0, the diﬀerence
in the derivatives is less than or equal (λ − 1)(q − q′) for p slightly above p¯. This implies that
0 < wF,q′(p)−wF,q(p) ≤ (λ− 1)(q− q′)(v + p) holds for p slightly above p¯ as well, a contradiction.
To complete the proof, note that similarly to the above, 0 < wF,q′(p) − wF,q(p) ≤ (λ− 1)(q −
q′)(v + p) implies that
∫ ∞
0
(1−H(wF,q(p)))dF (p)−
∫ ∞
0
(1−H(wF,q′(p)))dF (p) < (q − q′),
which proves that the map q 
→ ∫∞0 (1−H(wF,q(p)))dF (p) has slope less than 1.
Proof of Lemma 1.
Let A = b+(1+λ)v2 . Then, for any expectations by the consumer, she buys with probability zero
for any p ≥ A. Thus, we can restrict attention to pricing distributions on the interval [0, A].
Let P (c) be a function that maps marginal cost into a price p ∈ [0, A], and let FP be the
cumulative distribution function over prices induced by P and the distribution of costs. It is easy to
see that we can further restrict attention to pricing functions that are non-decreasing in cost: Since
for any pricing distribution, demand is decreasing in p, in an optimal pricing strategy production
decreases in costs (that is, the ﬁrm produces more in low-cost states, and less in high-cost states).
By Tychonoﬀ’s theorem, the product of compact topological spaces is compact. The space of
functions from a compact set to a compact set, endowed with the topology of pointwise convergence,
is isomorphic to a product of compact sets. Therefore, the space of such functions is compact in
the pointwise topology. Furthermore, the set of increasing functions is a closed subset of this space
(the pointwise limit of an increasing function is increasing), so is itself compact.
34
Let → stand for pointwise convergence. Below, we show that if Pi → P , then demand at any
price [1 − H(wq∗(FPi ),FPi (p))] → [1 − H(wq∗(FP ),FP (p))]. Hence, by Lebesque’s dominated conver-
gence theorem, and using that the composite of two pointwise continuous functions is pointwise
continuous,
∫ c
c
[Pi(c)− c] · [1−H(wq∗(FPi)),FPi (Pi(c)))] dΘ(c) →
∫ c
c
[P (c)− c] · [1−H(wq∗(FP ),FP (P (c)))] dΘ(c).
Therefore proﬁts are pointwise continuous in Pi, and hence byWeierstrass’ theorem (that continuous
functions over a compact set have a maximum) there exists an optimal pricing function.
We are left to show that if Pi → P , then
[1−H(wq∗(FPi),FPi (p))]→ [1−H(wq∗(FP ),FP (p))].
Observe that FPi(p) converges at all but countably many points to FP (p). Namely, it converges
at all points p where P−1(p) is unique; since P is non-decreasing, this is true unless P has a ﬂat
part at p, which can only happen at countably many points. Furthermore, recall that wq,F (·)(0) is
independent of F (·), and that
∂wF,q
∂p
= 2+ (λ− 1)(1− q) + (λ− 1)
∫ p
0
(1−H(wF,q(p′)))dF (p′).
Since we can “build up” wq,F (·) using the Fundamental Theorem of Calculus, the fact that H(·) is
continuous allows us to apply Lebesque’s dominated convergence theorem repeatedly by transﬁnite
induction,33 to conclude that
∂wFPi ,q
∂p is almost everywhere equal to
∂wFP ,q
∂p . Therefore, wq,FPi →
wq,FP .
We complete the proof by establishing that q∗(FPi) → q∗(FP ). This is suﬃcient because wq,F
is continuous in q.
The personal equilibrium probability of buying is determined by the property that
q =
∫ ∞
−∞
[1−H(wq,F (p))] dF (p).
We prove that the right-hand side of this equation is continuous in F . Combined with the fact that
the equilibrium is unique for all pricing distributions, this implies that q∗(F ) is continuous in F .
Using integration by parts,
∫ ∞
−∞
[1−H(wq,F (p′))] dF (p′) = −
∫ ∞
−∞
∂[1−H(wq,F (p′))]
∂p
F (p′)dp′.
We have shown above that the derivative of demand converges pointwise almost everywhere. There-
fore, the result follows from again applying Lebesgue’s dominated convergence theorem.
This completes the proof that a pricing equilibrium exists.
33 Here, transﬁnite induction is applied to the property that wFPi ,q converges pointwise to wFP ,q on [0, p].
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We now ﬁnd a w¯ that satisﬁes the requirements of the Lemma. Suppose that the optimal pricing
distribution is F . Denote the maximum price in the support of F by p¯ ≤ A. If p¯ ≤ c¯, the result is
obvious by the assumption on the support of H . Suppose therefore that p¯ > c¯.
We prove by contradiction that
(p¯− c¯) · 2h(wF,q∗(F )(p¯)) < 1−H(wF,q∗(F )(p¯)).
Suppose the opposite is the case. Then, since w′F,q∗(F )(p¯) > 2, holding the consumer’s expectations
constant (so that wF,q∗(F ) determines demand), the ﬁrm could increase its revenues at price p¯
by lowering this price. Of course, this change also aﬀects the consumer’s continuation personal
equilibrium by increasing the probability of buying. If the ﬁrm makes positive average proﬁts at all
prices, this further increases proﬁts. If there is a positive measure of prices where the ﬁrm makes
negative proﬁts, we construct a new price distribution with which the probability of buying is the
same as with F in the following way. First, we raise prices in the region where proﬁts are negative
to keep the overall probability of buying the same. Second, we raise prices above this region to
keep the probability of buying at each of those prices constant. Each of these changes increases
proﬁts, contradicting that F was an optimal pricing strategy.
Finally, we show that w = a satisﬁes the requirements of the Lemma. Suppose the lowest price
on the support of F is p. Suppose by contradiction that wF,q∗(F )(p) < a. Then, for prices at and
near p, the consumer buys with probability one, and she would still do so if the ﬁrm increased
prices in this range. Furthermore, by a proof identical to that in Proposition 2, this increase in
prices can be used to increase proﬁts at higher prices as well. This contradicts that F is proﬁt
maximizing.
Proof of Proposition 2.
Part I. Let q∗ be the probability of buying with the price distribution F , and G∗ the distribution
of buying prices conditional on buying. In the proof, we will use the convention that a subscript
on a probability (“Prob”) denotes the distribution with respect to which the probability should be
taken.
We start by restricting attention to discrete distributions with ﬁnitely many atoms. For any
positive integer J, notice that there is a proﬁt-maximizing discrete price distribution with at most
J atoms. As in Lemma 1, we can restrict attention to distributions on [0, A]. Now, the set of
discrete price distributions on [0, A] with at most J atoms is compact. Furthermore, the ﬁrm’s
proﬁts are continuous in the pricing distribution. Thus, there is a proﬁt-maximizing distribution
among them. We prove that there exists a dmin > 0 such that for any J, the proﬁt-maximizing
price distribution with at most J atoms satisﬁes the property that its atoms are at least dmin apart.
We prove this by contradiction. Suppose that the price distribution F has two neighboring
atoms p1 and p2 of F , with p1 < p2 and p2 − p1 = 2d. We show that if d is suﬃciently small, F
cannot be proﬁt-maximizing.
We start by constructing the distribution F1 from F in the following way. We take a small
weight  > 0 (to be speciﬁed below) from each of the atoms p1 and p2, and replace it with an atom
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p¯ that satisﬁes
1−H(wF,q∗(p1)) + 1−H(wF,q∗(p2))
2
= 1−H(wF1,q∗(p¯)),
which implies that the overall probability of buying the good (conditional on price being on this
interval) stays ﬁxed.
Deﬁne the price p implicitly through
1−H(wF,q∗(p1)) + 1−H(wF,q∗(p2))
2
= 1−H(wF,q∗(p)).
Since H is diﬀerentiable, for any κ < 1 there is a dκ > 0 such that if d < dκ, then 1κd > p−p1 > κd.
Furthermore, since H ′′ is bounded, we can choose dκ to be independent of p1 and p2.
It follows from Equation 8 that on the interval (0, p1), wF,q∗ = wF1,q∗ and on the interval (p1, p),
wF,q∗ > wF1,q∗. Hence, since by deﬁnition wF,q∗(p) = wF1,q∗(p¯), one has p¯ > p. Now, note that on
the interval (p1, p) both curves wF,q∗ and wF1,q∗ are linear, and using equation 8 we have that the
diﬀerence in slopes is (λ− 1)[1− H(wF,q∗(p1))]. If using  = min{ProbF (p1), ProbF (p2)} yields
p¯ ∈ (p1, p2), then we use that weight. Otherwise, we use the weight  that yields p¯ = p2.
Since diﬀerence in slopes on the interval (p1, p) is (λ−1)[1−H(wF,q∗(p1))] and since p−p1 > κd,
the diﬀerence wF,q∗(p) − wF1,q∗(p) ≥ (λ − 1)κd[1 − H(wF,q∗(p1))]. Using this and the fact that
wF,q∗(p) = wF1,q∗(p¯) and that the slope of the curve wF1,q∗ is at most λ + 1, we have
p¯− p ≥ λ− 1
λ+ 1
κd[1−H(wF,q∗(p1))]. (15)
Furthermore, notice that by the Regularity Condition on H ,
p(1−H(wF,q∗(p)) > p1(1−H(wF,q
∗(p1)) + p2(1−H(wF,q∗(p2))
2
.
Since by deﬁnition (1 − H(wF,q∗(p¯)) = (1 − H(wF1,q∗(p)), this implies that the change increases
revenues on this interval by at least
λ− 1
λ + 1
κd(1−H(wF,q∗(p1)))(1−H(wF,q∗(p))). (16)
The above calculation also implies that the change increases purchase probability-weighted price
by at least 2 times Expression 16 (the probability of the price being on the changed interval, times
the minimum revenue change on that interval). Hence, wF,q∗(p2) > wF1,q∗(p2), and wF,q∗(p2) −
wF1,q∗(p2) is at least 2 times Expression 16. Furthermore, Equation 8 implies that above p2 the
slopes of wF,q∗ and wF1,q∗ are identical. Hence, wF1,q∗ leads to a purchasing probability q > q
∗.
We thus construct a new pricing distribution F2, which is identical to F1 for prices p ≤ p, but for
which q = q∗.
Suppose p3 is the smallest atom of F1 above p¯. (Note that p3 may equal p2.) We construct the
distribution of prices F2 from F1 by shifting the entire distribution starting at p3 by the amount ∆
satisfying wF2,q∗(p3 + ∆) = wF,q∗(p3). Given our lower bound for wF,q∗(p2) − wF1,q∗(p2), we must
have
∆ ≥ 2 · 1
1 + λ
· λ− 1
λ + 1
κd(1−H(wF,q∗(p1)))(1−H(wF,q∗(p))).
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Since by replacing (part of) the atoms p1 and p2 with an atom at p¯, we have kept the probability
of buying the same, this ensures that for any p ≥ p3, we have wF2,q∗(p+∆) = wF,q∗(p). Thus, since
we have kept the probability of buying at all atoms the same, q∗ is the equilibrium probability of
buying with the price distribution F2. All these changes have increased the ﬁrm’s revenues by at
least 2 times
λ− 1
λ + 1
κd(1−H(wF,q∗(p1)))(1−H(wF,q∗(p)))
(
1 +
1
1 + λ
ProbF2(p ≥ p¯)
)
.
We next consider production costs. To minimize production costs the ﬁrm associates with each
price an interval of marginal costs, with higher prices being associated with higher marginal costs.
Thus, when using the original pricing distribution F, there exists an interval of marginal costs
[c1, c1] associated with the price p1 and an interval [c1, c2] associated with the price p2. When the
ﬁrm moves mass  from prices p1 and p2 to price p, it moves the highest marginal costs originally
associated with p1 and the lowest marginal cost originally associated with p2 to a new interval [c′, c′′]
that now is associated with p such that
∫ c1
c′ θ(c)dc =  and
∫ c′′
c1
θ(c)dc = . Since θ is continuous,
we can choose  small enough so that
∫ c′′
c1
cθ(c)dc−
∫ c1
c′
cθ(c)dc ≤ 1
κ
· 
θ(c1)
.
When using the pricing distribution F , the diﬀerence in production between the two prices p1
and p2 is H(wF,q∗(p2))−H(wF,q∗(p1)). Thus, when switching to the new pricing distribution, the
ﬁrm’s production cost increase by less than
1
κ
· 
θ(c1)
· [H(wF,q∗(p2))−H(wF,q∗(p1))]
2
.
For any κ < 1, we can choose d′κ so that
H(wF,q∗(p2))−H(wF,q∗(p1)) < 1
κ
h(wF,q∗(p1))2d(λ+ 1). (17)
Thus, the ﬁrm’s saving is at most
h(wF,q∗(p1))d(λ+ 1)
θ(c1)κ2
.
In sum, for d < dκ, d′κ, proﬁts on the interval increase if
λ− 1
(λ+ 1)2
κd(1−H(wF,q∗(p1))) (1−H(wF,q∗(p)))
(
1 +
1
1 + λ
ProbF2(p ≥ p¯)
)
>
h(wF,q∗(p1))d
θ(c1)κ2
or
θ(c1)
(
1 +
1
1 + λ
ProbF2(p ≥ p¯)
)
>
h(wF,q∗(p1))
(1−H(wF,q∗(p1))) (1−H(wF,q∗(p))) ·
1
κ3
· (λ+ 1)
2
λ− 1 .
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Since higher prices are associated with higher costs, we have ProbF2(p ≥ p¯) = 1−Θ(c′′). Thus, the
above becomes
θ(c1)
(
1 +
1− Θ(c′′)
1 + λ
)
>
h(wF,q∗(p1))
(1−H(wF,q∗(p1))) (1−H(wF,q∗(p))) ·
1
κ3
· (λ+ 1)
2
λ− 1 .
By assumption, this is true if κ is suﬃciently close to 1 and  is suﬃciently small.
To complete the proof, we use the fact that all distributions F ∗ can be approximated arbitrarily
closely (for the purposes of proﬁts) by discrete distributions. Namely, for any j, we can break up
the support of F ∗ into intervals of length 1
2j
, and on each interval, replace the prices with an atom
at the average. Call this discrete distribution Fj . As j → ∞, the proﬁts with Fj approach the
proﬁts with F ∗.
Now, using the above procedure, we can replace each Fj by a discrete distribution F ′j that yields
higher proﬁts than Fj and has atoms at least dmin apart. Hence, there is a maximum number of mass
points that a distribution F ′j can have. Thus, the distributions F
′
j have a convergent subsequence
of pricing distribution which have the same number of mass points. Consider this subsequence and
order the mass points from the lowest to the highest. As the ﬁrst mass points lies in the interval
[0, A], this sequence has a convergent subsequence in which the ﬁrst mass point converges. Consider
this subsequence, it must have a subsequence in which the second mass point converges, etc... .
Hence, the distributions F ′j have a convergent subsequence, whose atoms are at least dmin apart.
Obviously, this limit yields at least as high proﬁts as F ∗.
Finally, we establish that if F ∗ does not have the property that it is discrete and each of its
atoms are at least dmin apart, then it does not maximize proﬁts. Posit that F ∗ does not have this
property. Then, by essentially the same argument as above, we can ﬁnd a discrete distribution F ′
which yields at least as high proﬁts as F ∗, but whose atoms are not all at least dmin apart. Then,
again using our argument above, we can ﬁnd a discrete distribution F ′′ which has strictly higher
proﬁts than F ′, a contradiction.
Part II. We prove by contradiction. Suppose that the price distribution F has an atom at p,
with probability r. We prove that it is in the ﬁrm’s interest to break this atom into two atoms with
weight r2 each, and move the two atoms slightly apart.
Assume for a moment that p is an “isolated” atom: there is a neighborhood of p with measure
r. In that case, we can do the reverse of the estimation in Part I with the following key changes.
Namely, we need a an upper bound on the revenue decrease from splitting up a pricing atom, and
a lower bound on the cost savings. Therefore, the “revenue inequality” corresponding to Inequality
15, which bounds the revenue decrease from above, will read
p¯− p ≤ λ− 1
2
· 1
κ
d[1−H(wF,q∗(p1))].
The right-hand side of this inequality diﬀers from that of Inequality 15 in two ways. First, we use a
lower bound on the slope of wF1,q∗ , and therefore replace 1+λ by 2. Second, to get an upper bound,
we have 1κ instead of κ. On the other hand, the “cost inequality” corresponding to Inequality 17
becomes
H(wF,q∗(p2))−H(wF,q∗(p1)) > κh(wF,q∗(p1))4d.
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Here, we have used a lower bound on the slope of wF,q∗ , replacing 1 + λ with 2, and exchanged 1κ
with κ.
To complete the proof, note that as δ → 0, the measure of the interval of (p− δ, p+ δ) under F
approaches r. Thus, we can ignore the weight around p.
Proof of Proposition 3. Let q∗ be the consumer’s probability of purchase under the optimal
pricing distribution.
Let p(c) be the ﬁrm’s pricing function, and that the optimal price distribution is F . Suppose
by contradiction that there are some p1 and p2 with p2 = p(c2) > p(c1) = p1 and
(p2 − c2) + DF (p2)
D′F (p2)
≥ (p1 − c1) + DF (p1)
D′F (p1)
, (18)
Furthermore, since F is diﬀerentiable almost everywhere, we can choose p1 and p2 so that F is
diﬀerentiable at both points. The idea of the proof is to show that proﬁts can be increased by
pushing the price distribution closer together. More speciﬁcally, we take some weight from the left
of p1 and put it on p1, and take some weight from the right of p2, and put it on p2 in a way that
increases proﬁts.
Formally, we start by forming the price distribution F ′ in the following way. We take the weight
F places on the interval (p1−1, p1) and place it on p1, and take the weight F places on (p2, p2+2)
and place it on p2. Furthermore, we choose 1 and 2 so that
(F (p1)− F (p1 − 1))(1−H(wF,q∗(p1)) + (F (p2 + 2)− F (p2))(1−H(wF,q∗(p2))
=
∫ p1
p1−1
(1−H(wF,q∗(p))dF (p) +
∫ p2+2
p2
(1−H(wF,q∗(p))dF (p)
That is, under the demand function that would prevail with F , this change does not change total
demand. This means that we are moving demand from the low-price state to the high-price state.
Suppose the above changes increase average probability-weighted prices on the interval (p1 −
1, p1) by dp1, and decrease probability-weighted prices on the interval p2, p2 +  by dp2. We next
establish that by Inequality 18, under the demand curve DF , this either creates a gain in proﬁts
for suﬃciently small dp1 and dp2, or the decrease in proﬁts is second-order in dp1.
In the limit as dp1 approaches zero, we must have dp2 =
D′F (p1)
D′F (p2)
dp1 in order to keep overall
demand under DF constant. The change in proﬁts must be equal to
dp1(DF (p1) + (p1 − c1)D′F (p1))− dp2(DF (p2) + (p2 − c2)D′F (p2))
up to a term that is at most second-order in dp1. Substituting for dp2 and using 18 yields that the
above expression is greater than or equal to zero.
Now, it is easy to see that wF,q∗(p1) > wF ′,q∗(p1), and by Expression 5, the diﬀerence is ﬁrst-
order in dp1. To hold overall sales ﬁxed, we ﬁrst create the price distribution F ′′ from F ′ by shifting
all prices on the interval [p1, p2] by ∆ satisfying
wF,q∗(p1) = wF ′′,q∗(p1 + ∆).
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This ensures that wF,q∗(p) = wF ′′,q∗(p +∆) for all p ∈ [p1, p2]. In addition, ∆ is ﬁrst-order in dp1.
Now, we argue the average purchase price below (p2 + 2) is greater under wF ′′,q∗ than under
wF,q∗ . First, we constructed F ′′ so that demand given by wF ′′,q∗ and wF,q∗ is the same in this region.
Furthermore, we achieved this by moving demand from low-price states to high-price states, and
shifting the price distribution to the right. By Expression 5, both of these changes increase the
average purchase price.
Therefore,
wF,q∗(p2 + 2) > wF ′′,q∗(p2 + 2).
To complete the argument, we create the distribution F ′′′ from F ′′ by shifting all prices above
p2 + 2 by ∆′ so that
wF,q∗(p2 + 2) = wF ′′′,q∗(p2 + 2 +∆′).
Then, the probability of purchase under price distribution F ′′′ is also q∗. Since ∆ is ﬁrst-order in
dp1, F ′′′ clearly yields greater proﬁts than F .
Proof of Lemma 2. As in Lemma 1, let A = b+(1+λ)v2 . Then, for any expectations by the
consumer, the ﬁrm does not want to choose a price higher than A, since for any p ≥ A, the
consumer’s purchase probability is zero.
Consider the space P of increasing pricing functions from [c, c¯] to [0, A]. We deﬁne the function
φ : P → P in the following manner. φ(P ) is the ﬁrm’s optimal pricing strategy, if consumers expect
the pricing distribution induced by the pricing strategy P . (We will establish in a moment that φ
is indeed a function.) A ﬁxed point of φ deﬁnes a pricing equilibrium, so we prove that φ has a
ﬁxed point.
For any price distribution expectations F by the consumer and any realized c, the ﬁrm’s proﬁt
maximization problem is strictly concave by the strict convexity of wF,q∗(F ) and the regularity
condition on H . Thus, φ is indeed a function.
We have established in the proof of Lemma 1 that the demand curve 1 − H(wFP ,q∗(FP )(p))
is continuous in the pricing strategy P . Since the ﬁrm’s proﬁt maximization problem is strictly
concave, the ﬁrm’s optimal price for any realized c is also continuous in P . Thus, φ is a pointwise
continuous function. By the Kakutani-Fan-Glicksberg theorem, it has a ﬁxed point, completing the
existence proof.
We now ﬁnd a w¯ that satisﬁes the requirements of the Lemma. Suppose that the optimal pricing
distribution is F . Denote the maximum price in the support of F by p¯. Clearly, A ≥ p¯ > c¯.
We prove by contradiction that
(p¯− c¯) · 2h(wF,q∗(F )(p¯)) < 1−H(wF,q∗(F )(p¯)).
Suppose the opposite is the case. Then, since w′F,q∗(F )(p¯) > 2, the ﬁrm could increase its revenues
at price p¯ by lowering this price, which is proﬁtable as p¯ > c¯.
Finally, we show that w = a satisﬁes the requirements of the Lemma. Suppose the lowest price
on the support of F is p. Suppose by contradiction that wF,q∗(F )(p) < a. Then the consumer would
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still buy with probability one if the ﬁrm slightly raised its price, contradicting proﬁt maximization.
Proof of Proposition 4.
Part I. We prove by contradiction. Suppose that the ﬁrm’s price is not deterministic. First, it
is easy to show that there is a non-trivial interval I such that for any p ∈ I , there is a cost c ∈ [c, c¯]
such that the ﬁrm sets price p for that cost. To see this, note simply that the ﬁrm’s optimal price
p(c) is continuous in c.
Suppose the consumer expects to buy with probability q, and expects the distribution of buying
prices conditional on purchase to be G. Since the demand function is decreasing in p, it is diﬀeren-
tiable almost everywhere. Let p be a price for which the demand function is diﬀerentiable. Then,
the cost c for which the ﬁrm sets price p satisﬁes
h(wF,q,G(p))(p− c)[2 + (1− q)(λ− 1) + qG(p)(λ− 1)] = 1−H(wF,q,G(p)). (19)
Now take a sequence pi ↘ p such that the demand function is diﬀerentiable at each pi. Let the
corresponding costs be ci. Then, for each i we must have
h(wF,q,G(pi))(pi − ci)[2 + (1− q)(λ− 1) + qG(pi)(λ− 1)] = 1−H(wF,q,G(pi)).
For pi close to p, the diﬀerence in the two equations above can be approximated by
h(wF,q,G(p))(pi − p− ci + c)[2 + (1− q)(λ− 1) + qG(p)(λ− 1)]
+ h(wF,q,G(p))(p− c)(λ− 1)[qG(pi)− qG(p)]
+ h′(wF,q,G(p))(pi− p)(p− c)[2 + (1− q)(λ− 1) + qG(p)(λ− 1)]2
= −h(wF,q,G(p))[2 + (1− q)(λ− 1) + qG(p)(λ− 1)](pi − p).
Since p(c) is increasing in c, qG(pi)−qG(p) is the probability that the agent buys at prices between
p and pi. This can be approximated by (1 − H(wF,q,G(p)))(Θ(ci) − Θ(c)), which itself can be
approximated by (1−H(wF,q,G(p)))θ(c)(ci− c). Using this, the above becomes
pi − p
ci − c · [2 + (1− q)(λ− 1) + qG(p)(λ− 1)] ·
· [2h(wF,q,G(p)) + h′(wF,q,G(p))(p− c)[2 + (1− q)(λ− 1) + qG(p)(λ− 1)]
= h(wF,q,G(p))[[2 + (1− q)(λ− 1) + qG(p)(λ− 1)]− (p− c)(1−H(wF,q,G(p)))(λ− 1)θ(c)].
The left-hand side of the above equality is positive. To see this, note that all multiplicative terms
other than the last one are clearly positive. To prove that the last one is positive, diﬀerentiate the
hazard rate and substitute the ﬁrst-order condition 19.
To arrive at a contradiction, we show that the right-hand side of this inequality is less than
zero. Using the ﬁrst-order condition 19 to substitute for p− c, we want to show that
(λ− 1)θ(c) (1−H(wF,q,G(p)))
2
h(wF,q,G(p))[2 + (1− q)(λ− 1) + qG(p)(λ− 1)] ≥ 2 + (1− q)(λ− 1) + qG(p)(λ− 1).
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Now clearly 2+ (1− q)(λ− 1)+ qG(p)(λ− 1) ≤ 1+ λ, so this inequality follows from the condition
of the proposition. This completes the proof.
Part II. To show that any pricing equilibrium features a non-atomic price distribution, we do
the converse estimation to Part I.
Proof of Proposition 5.
Suppose the optimal commitment price is pc. We prove that if the consumer expects the ﬁrm
to charge pc with probability one, the ﬁrm would like to choose a higher price ex post. This implies
that the equilibrium Condition 13 is violated in the following way:
pc − c¯ <
1−H(wpc,q∗(pc)(pc))
h(wpc,q∗(pc)(pc)) · (2 + (λ− 1))
.
Recall that the right-hand side of the above inequality is decreasing in p, while the left-hand side
is increasing, so the interval of no-commitment equilibrium prices lies above pc.
Given that the ﬁrm charges a deterministic price, the equilibrium probability of buying, q∗(p),
is determined by
q∗(p) = 1−H [wp,q∗(p)(p)] ,
where wp,q∗(p)(p) = 2p − 2v + (1 − q∗(p))(λ− 1)p− q∗(p)(λ− 1)v. Let κ be the average marginal
cost of the ﬁrm.
With commitment, the ﬁrm solves
max
p
(p− κ) · [1−H(wp,q∗(p)(p))] ,
leading to the ﬁrst-order condition for the optimal commitment price pc of
1−H(wpc,q∗(pc)(pc))−(pc−κ)h(wpc,q∗(pc)(pc))
(
2 + (1− q∗(pc))(λ− 1)− ∂q
∗(pc)
∂pc
(λ− 1)(pc + v)
)
= 0.
(20)
We will show that the ﬁrm can gain ex post from charging a higher price than pc for all costs.
This implies that there is a proﬁtable deviation. For p′ ≥ pc, the ﬁrm’s average proﬁt from charging
p′ after the consumer has been expecting pc is
(p′ − κ) · [1−H(2p′ − 2v + (1− q∗(pc))(λ− 1)p′ − q∗(pc)(λ− 1)v + (λ− 1)q∗(pc)(p′ − pc))] .
The derivative of this with respect to p′ at pc is
1−H(wpc,q∗(pc)(pc))− (pc − κ)h(wpc,q∗(pc)(pc))(2 + (1− q∗(pc))(λ− 1) + (λ− 1)q∗(pc)). (21)
We will argue that Expression 21 is strictly greater than zero. By Equation 20, this is equivalent
to proving that
q∗(pc) < −∂q
∗(pc)
∂pc
(pc + v). (22)
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By the ﬁrm’s optimization problem under commitment,
(pc − κ) · ∂q
∗(pc)
∂pc
+ q∗(pc) = 0,
which implies Inequality 22.
Proof of Proposition 6.
For any given reference lottery, it is clear that there is a price pr (not necessarily in the support
of the expected price distribution) below which the consumer buys the good, and above which
she does not. Consequently, equilibrium behavior also has this property. Now, analogously to
Expression 5, if the consumer expects to buy for prices strictly below pr, then the diﬀerence in
utility between buying and not buying at pr is
Bf (pr) ≡ 1− pr − (λ− 1)
∫ pr
0
(pr − p′)dF (p′) + F (pr)(λ− pr) + (1− F (pr))(1− λpr). (23)
Clearly, pr is the reservation price in a continuation equilibrium if Bf (pr) = 0, and if Bf (p) > 0
for all p in or below the support of F , in the unique personal equilibrium the consumer buys with
probability one.
We will solve for a continuous price distribution Fmin that has a connected support with a lower
bound of pmin, which satisﬁes
Bf (p) = 1− p− (λ− 1)
∫ p
0
(p− p′)dF (p′) + F (p)(λ− p) + (1− F (p))(1− λp) = 0, (24)
for any p on its support. Let πmin be the proﬁts if the ﬁrm chooses Fmin and the consumer always
buys the good. Our strategy for the proof is the following: First, we argue that πmin is a lower
bound for equilibrium proﬁts. Second, if πmin > 0, we construct an equilibrium in which the ﬁrm
earns πmin. To show the second step, observe that the consumer is willing to buy with probability
one if the ﬁrm selects Fmin. We will show that the ﬁrm cannot do better if for any other chosen
pricing distribution F the consumer plays the worst possible personal equilibrium. This step will
also imply that if πmin ≤ 0, then the ﬁrm’s minimum proﬁt is zero.
Step 1. For any  > 0, if the ﬁrm shifts the distribution Fmin to the left by  then Expression
23 is strictly greater than zero for any price on the support. Therefore in the unique continuation
equilibrium the consumer always buys the good and proﬁts are πmin − . Thus in equilibrium the
ﬁrm’s proﬁts cannot be lower πmin.
Step 2. We show that for any distribution F , if the consumer plays the worst possible con-
tinuation equilibrium and the ﬁrm’s proﬁt is positive, it is less than πmin. This implies that if
πmin ≤ 0, the lowest possible proﬁt level is zero, and (in combination with Step 1) it also means
that if πmin > 0, it is the lowest possible proﬁt level.
We carry out the proof by performing a set of changes to F , each of which increases the ﬁrm’s
proﬁts, and which approach Fmin. First, notice that for any distribution of prices F which leads
to selling the good with probability less than 1, the ﬁrm can do better. To see this, suppose that
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the reservation price in the lowest-proﬁt personal equilibrium is pr, and F (pr) < 1. Since this
equilibrium leads to positive proﬁts for the ﬁrm, we must have pr > c. Then, consider putting the
weight 1 − F (pr) on the price pr − . By Expression 23, for a suﬃciently small , the consumer
buys with probability one, increasing expected proﬁts.
Thus, we look for price distributions F for which the unique equilibrium is for the consumer to
buy the good at any price in the support of F . Among these pricing choices, proﬁt maximization
is equivalent to revenue maximization. Let [p, p¯] be the smallest closed interval that contains the
support of F . The constraint that the consumer buys with probability one implies that for any
p ∈ [0, p¯), the equilibrium reservation price has to be greater than p. To check this, it must be the
case that if the consumer expects to buy the good at prices below p, she would be willing to buy
it at price p. Using Expression 23, this is equivalent to saying that
1− p− (λ− 1)
∫ p
0
(p− p′)dF (p′) + F (p)(λ− p) + (1− F (p))(1− λp) > 0. (25)
Now take any  > 0. We prove that for any distribution for which the above expression is
greater than  on a positive measure subset of [p, p¯], the ﬁrm can increase proﬁts by bringing it
below  everywhere. First, if for any δ > 0, F (pmin − δ) > 0, the ﬁrm can increase proﬁts by
replacing all weight below pmin − δ by a point mass at pmin − δ. (By Expression 23, this does not
decrease the reservation price pr ≥ pmin, and hence must increase proﬁts.) By the deﬁnition of
pmin the left-hand-side limit of Expression 23 is zero at pmin for any distribution that places no
weight below pmin. By continuity, for a suﬃciently small δ, this will result in a distribution for
which Expression 23 is less than  for any p < pmin − δ suﬃciently close to pmin − δ.
Now suppose that Expression is less than or equal to  for any p < p1 with p ∈ [p, p¯], but that it
goes above  on some interval [p1, p2]. For this to be the case, either p1 has to be a point mass of F ,
or F must put positive weight on the interval (p1, p2). Consider changing the distribution of prices
in the following way. If p1 is an atom of F , take oﬀ a weight from p1 so that with the remaining
weight, Expression 23 equals  for p = p1. Take this weight, and whatever other weight F places
on the on (p1, p2], and put all of that weight on p2. This change increases the left-hand side of
Expression 24 for any p > p2, and does not aﬀect it for p < p1. Furthermore, the left-hand-side of
Expression 24 is continuously decreasing over any interval in which there is no probability weight
and hence, if p2−p1 is suﬃciently small, the expression will be (weakly) less than  and greater than
zero on [p1, p2]. Thus, the new price distribution still satisﬁes the condition that the consumer buys
with probability one, and it has higher expected proﬁts. Using this step, by transﬁnite induction
we can increase proﬁts by constructing a price distribution for which Expression 23 is less than or
equal to  everywhere.34 As  converges to zero, F converges pointwise to Fmin, and therefore the
associated proﬁts converge to πmin, completing Step 2.
Finally, we characterize Fmin. Taking the derivative of both sides of Equation 24 yields
−1− (λ− 1)F (p)− F (p)− λ(1− F (p)) + f(p)(λ− 1)(p+ 1) = 0.
34 To apply transﬁnite induction on (pmin − δ,∞), let P (a) be the property that there is an F ′ constructed from
F using our step such that either a is above the support of F ′, or for F ′, Expression 23 is between zero and  for
pmin − δ < p < a.
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This gives
f(p) =
λ + 1
(λ− 1)(p+ 1) .
Integrating gives
F (p) =
λ+ 1
λ− 1 ln(p + 1) + constant.
Using the condition that F (pmin) = 0, we get
F (p) =
λ+ 1
λ− 1 ln
(
p + 1
pmin + 1
)
.
Setting F (p¯) = 1 gives
p¯ = exp
(
λ− 1
λ + 1
)
· (pmin + 1)− 1.
Finally, the pieces are together to calculate the ﬁrm’s expected revenue:
∫ p¯
pmin
pf(p)dp =
∫ p¯
pmin
λ+ 1
λ− 1 ·
(
1− 1
p + 1
)
dp =
λ + 1
λ− 1 · (p¯− pmin)− 1.
Substituting for p¯ and rearranging completes the proof.
References
Aoyagi (2002): “Eﬃcient Collusion in Repeated Auctions with Communication,” Working Paper.
Athey, S., and K. Bagwell (2001): “Optimal Collusion with Private Information,” RAND
Journal of Economics, 32(3), 428–465.
Athey, S., K. Bagwell, and C. Sanchirico (2004): “Collusion and Price Rigidity,” Review of
Economic Studies, 71(2), 317–349.
Barberis, N., M. Huang, and T. Santos (2001): “Prospect Theory and Asset Prices,” Quar-
terly Journal of Economics, 116(1), 1–53.
Barberis, N., M. Huang, and R. Thaler (2003): “Individual Preferences, Monetary Gambles
and the Equity Premium,” URL: http://www.stanford.edu/ mhuang/papers/BHT.pdf.
Benartzi, S., and R. H. Thaler (1995): “Myopic Loss Aversion and the Equity Premium
Puzzle,” Quarterly Journal of Economics, 111(1), 73–92.
Bewley, T. F. (1998): “Why Not Cut Pay?,” European Economic Review, 42(3-5), 459–490.
Bils, M. (1987): “The Cyclical Behavior of Marginal Cost and Price,” American Economic Review,
77(5), 838–855.
46
Blinder, A. S. (1998): Asking about Prices: A New Approach to Understanding Price Stickiness.
New York: Russell Sage Foundation.
Blinder, A. S., E. R. D. Canetti, D. E. Lebow, and J. B. Rudd (1998): Asking About
Prices: A New Approach to Understanding Price Stickiness. Russell Sage Foundation.
Blume, A., and P. Heidhues (2002): “Modeling Tacit Collusion in Auctions,” Working Paper.
(2003): “Private Monitoring in Auctions,” Working Paper.
Carlton, D. W. (1986): “The Rigidity of Prices,” American Economic Review, 76(4), 637–658.
(1989): “The Theory and the Facts of How Markets Clear: Is Industrial Organization
Valuable for Understanding Macroeconomics?,” in Handbook of Industrial Organization, Volume
1, ed. by R. Schmalensee, and R. Willig, vol. 1, pp. 909–946. Elsevier Science Publishers B.V.
Chevalier, J., and D. Scharfstein (1996): “Capital-Market Imperfections and Countercyclical
Markups: Theory and Evidence,” American Economic Review, 86(4), 703–725.
Chevalier, J. A., A. K. Kashyap, and P. E. Rossi (2000): “Why Don’t Prices Rise During
Periods of Peak Demand? Evidence from Scanner Data,” NBER Working Paper No. 7981.
Conlisk, J., E. Gerstner, and J. Sobel (1984): “Cyclic Pricing by a Durable Goods Monop-
olist,” Quarterly Journal of Economics, 99(3), 489–505.
DellaVigna, S., and U. Malmendier (2004): “Contract Design and Self-Control: Theory and
Evidence,” Quarterly Journal of Economics, 119(2), 353–402.
Erickson, G. M., and J. K. Johansson (1985): “The Role of Price in Multi-attribute Product
Evaluations,” Journal of Consumer Research, 12(2), 195–199.
Fudenberg, D., and D. K. Levine (1988): “Reputation, Unobserved Strategies, and Active
Supermartingales,” MIT Department of Economics Working Paper #490.
(1989): “Reputation and Equilibrium Selection in Games with a Patient Player,” Econo-
metrica, 57(4), 759–778.
Gabaix, X., and D. Laibson (2004a): “Competition and Consumer Confusion,” MIT Working
Paper; URL: http://econ-www.mit.edu/faculty/download pdf.php?id=906.
(2004b): “Shrouded Attributes and Information Suppression in Competitive Markets,”
MIT Working Paper; URL: http://econ-www.mit.edu/faculty/download pdf.php?id=527.
Gal-Or, E. (1982): “Hotelling’s Spatial Competition as a Model of Sales,” Economic Letters, 9,
1–6.
Genesove, D., and C. Mayer (2001): “Loss Aversion and Seller Behavior: Evidence from the
Housing Market,” Quarterly Journal of Economics, 116(4), 1233–1260.
47
Hall, R. L., and C. . J. Hitch (1939): “Price Theory and Business Behavior,” Oxford Economic
Papers, 2, 12–45.
Hardie, B. G. S., E. J. Johnson, and P. S. Fader (1993): “Modeling Loss Aversion and
Reference Dependence Eﬀects on Brand Choice,” Marketing Science, 12(4), 378–394.
Hoch, S. J., X. Dre´ze, and M. E. Purk (1994): “EDLP, Hi-Lo, and Margin Arithmetic,”
Journal of Marketing, 58(4).
Ho¨rner, J., and J. S. Jamison (2004): “Collusion with (Almost) No Information,” Northwestern
Working Paper.
Kahneman, D., J. L. Knetsch, and R. H. Thaler (1990): “Experimental Tests of the Endow-
ment Eﬀect and the Coase Theorem,” Journal of Political Economy, 98(6), 1325–1348.
(1991): “Anomalies: The Endowment Eﬀect, Loss Aversion, and Status Quo Bias,”
Journal of Economic Perspectives, 5(1), 193–206.
Kahneman, D., and A. Tversky (1979): “Prospect Theory: An Analysis of Decision under
Risk,” Econometrica, 47(2), 263–291.
Kalwani, M. U., and C. K. Yim (1992): “Consumer Price and Promotion Expectations: An
Experimental Study,” Journal of Marketing Research, 29, 90–100.
Kashyap, A. K. (1995): “Sticky Prices: New Evidence from Retail Catalogs,” Quarterly Journal
of Economics, 110(1), 245–274.
Ko˝szegi, B. (2004): “Anticipation in Observable Behavior,” Working Paper, UC Berkeley.
Ko˝szegi, B., and M. Rabin (2004): “A Model of Reference-Dependent Preferences,” Economics
Department, University of California, Berkeley, Working Paper E04-337.
Klemperer, p. (1995): “Competition when Consumers have Switching Costs: An Overview with
Applications to Industrial Organization, Macroeconomics, and International Trade,” Review of
Economic Studies, 62(4), 515–539.
Marketing News (1985): “Panelists Oﬀer Pricing Strategy Advice for Consumer and Industrial
Products,” Marketing News, 19(3), 1–3.
Maskin, E., and J. Tirole (1988): “A Theory of Dynamic Oligopoly, II: Price Competition,
Kinked Demand Curves, and Edgeworth Cycles,” Econometrica, 56(3), 571–599.
Means, G. (1935): “Industrial Prices and their Relative Inﬂexibility,” Senate Document 13, 74th
Congress, 1st session. Washington D.C.: US Government Printing Oﬃce.
Mills, F. (1927): The behavior of prices. New York: National Bureau of Economic Research.
Nocke, V., and M. Peitz (2003): “Hyperbolic Discounting and Secondary Markets,” Games and
Economic Behavior, 44(1), 77–97.
48
Odean, T. (1998): “Are Investors Reluctant to Realize Their Losses?,” Mimeo, UC Davis.
Rabin, M. (2000): “Diminishing Marginal Utility of Wealth Cannot Explain Risk Aversion,” in
Choices, Values, and Frames, ed. by D. Kahneman, and A. Tversky, chap. 11, pp. 202–208. New
York: Russell Sage Foundation.
Rotemberg, J. J. (2002): “Customer Anger at Price Increases, Time Variation in the Frequency
of Price Changes and Monetary Policy,” NBER Working Paper No. 9320.
(2004): “Fair Pricing,” NBER Working Paper No. 10915.
Rotemberg, J. J., and G. Saloner (1986): “A Supergame Theoretic Model of Business Cycles
and Price Wars During Booms,” American Economic Review, 76(3), 390–407.
Salop, S. (1977): “The Noisy Monopolist: Imperfect Information, Price Dispersion, and Price
Discrimination,” Review of Economic Studies, 44, 393–406.
Salop, S., and J. Stiglitz (1982): “The Theory of Sales: A Simple Model of Equilibrium Price
Dispersion with Identical Agents,” American Economic Review, 72(5), 1121–1130.
Shilony, Y. (1977): “Mixed Pricing in Oligopoly,” Journal of Economic Theory, 14, 373–388.
Skrzypacz, A., and H. Hopenhayn (2004): “Tacit Collusion in Repeated Auctions,” Journal of
Economic Theory, 114, 153–169.
Slade, M. (1999): “Sticky Prices in a Dynamic Oligopoly: An Investigation of (s, S) Thresholds,”
International Journal of Industrial Organization, 17, 477–511.
Sobel, J. (1984): “The Timing of Sales,” Review of Economic Studies, 51(3), 353–368.
Sobel, J. (1991): “Durable Goods Monopolist with Entry of New Consumers,” Econometrica,
59(5), 1455–1485.
Stiglitz, J. (1984): “Price Rigidities and Market Structure,” American Economic Review, 74(2),
350–355.
Sweezy, P. (1939): “Demand Conditions under Oligopoly,” Journal of Political Economy, 47,
568–573.
Tversky, A., and D. Kahneman (1991): “Loss Aversion in Riskless Choice: A Reference-
Dependent Model,” Quarterly Journal of Economics, 106(4), 1039–1061.
Varian, H. R. (1980): “A Model of Sales,” American Economic Review, 70(4), 651–659.
Winer, R. S. (1986): “A Reference Price Model of Brand Choice for Frequently Purchased Prod-
ucts,” Journal of Consumer Research, 13(2), 250–256.
49
Bücher des Forschungsschwerpunkts Markt und politische Ökonomie  
Books of the Research Area Markets and Political Economy 
  
 
Pablo Beramendi 
Decentralization and Income Inequality 
2003, Madrid: Juan March Institute 
Thomas Cusack 
A National Challenge at the Local Level: Citizens, 
Elites and Institutions in Reunified Germany 
2003, Ashgate 
Sebastian Kessing 
Essays on Employment Protection 
2003, Freie Universität Berlin,  
http://www.diss.fu-berlin.de/2003/202 
Daniel Krähmer 
On Learning and Information in Markets and 
Organizations 
2003, Shaker Verlag 
Bob Hancké 
Large Firms and Institutional Change. Industrial 
Renewal and Economic Restructuring in France 
2002, Oxford University Press 
Andreas Stephan 
Essays on the Contribution of Public Infrastruc-
ture to Private:  Production and its Political 
Economy 
2002, dissertation.de 
Peter A. Hall, David Soskice (Eds.) 
Varieties of Capitalism 
2001, Oxford University Press 
Hans Mewis 
Essays on Herd Behavior and Strategic Delegation 
2001, Shaker Verlag 
Andreas Moerke 
Organisationslernen über Netzwerke – Die 
personellen Verflechtungen von Führungsgremien 
japanischer Aktiengesellschaften 
2001, Deutscher Universitäts-Verlag 
Silke Neubauer 
Multimarket Contact and Organizational Design 
2001, Deutscher Universitäts-Verlag 
Lars-Hendrik Röller, Christian Wey (Eds.) 
Die Soziale Marktwirtschaft in der neuen 
Weltwirtschaft, WZB Jahrbuch 2001 
2001, edition sigma 
Michael Tröge 
Competition in Credit Markets: A Theoretic 
Analysis 
2001, Deutscher Universitäts-Verlag 
Torben Iversen, Jonas Pontusson, David Soskice 
(Eds.) 
Unions, Employers, and Central Banks 
2000, Cambridge University Press 
Tobias Miarka 
Financial Intermediation and Deregulation:  
A Critical Analysis of Japanese Bank-Firm-
Relationships 
2000, Physica-Verlag 
Rita Zobel 
Beschäftigungsveränderungen und 
organisationales Lernen in japanischen 
Industriengesellschaften 
2000, Humboldt-Universität zu Berlin 
http://dochost.rz.hu-berlin.de/dissertationen/zobel-rita-
2000-06-19  
Jos Jansen 
Essays on Incentives in Regulation and Innovation 
2000, Tilburg University 
Ralph Siebert 
Innovation, Research Joint Ventures, and 
Multiproduct Competition 
2000, Humboldt-Universität zu Berlin 
http://dochost.rz.hu-berlin.de/dissertationen/siebert-
ralph-2000-03-23/  
Damien J. Neven, Lars-Hendrik Röller (Eds.) 
The Political Economy of Industrial Policy in 
Europe and the Member States 
2000, edition sigma 
Jianping Yang 
Bankbeziehungen deutscher Unternehmen: 
Investitionsverhalten und Risikoanalyse 
2000, Deutscher Universitäts-Verlag 
Christoph Schenk 
Cooperation between Competitors – 
Subcontracting and the Influence of Information, 
Production and Capacity on Market Structure and 
Competition 
1999, Humboldt-Universität zu Berlin 
http://dochost.rz.hu-berlin.de/dissertationen/schenk-
christoph-1999-11-16  
Horst Albach, Ulrike Görtzen, Rita Zobel (Eds.) 
Information Processing as a Competitive 
Advantage of Japanese Firms 
1999, edition sigma 
Dieter Köster 
Wettbewerb in Netzproduktmärkten 
1999, Deutscher Universitäts-Verlag 
Christian Wey 
Marktorganisation durch Standardisierung: Ein 
Beitrag zur Neuen Institutionenökonomik des 
Marktes 
1999, edition sigma 
DISCUSSION PAPERS 2003 
 
 
Annette Boom Investments in Electricity Generating Capacity 
under Different Market Structures and with 
Endogenously Fixed Demand 
SP II 2003 – 01 
Kai A. Konrad 
Wolfram F. Richter 
Zur Berücksichtigung von Kindern 
bei umlagefinanzierter Alterssicherung 
SP II 2003 – 02 
Stergios Skaperdas Restraining the Genuine Homo Economicus:  
Why the Economy cannot be divorced from its 
Governance 
SP II 2003 – 03 
Johan Lagerlöf Insisting on a Non-Negative Price: Oligopoly, 
Uncertainty, Welfare, and Multiple Equilibria 
SP II 2003 – 04 
Roman Inderst 
Christian Wey 
Buyer Power and Supplier Incentives SP II 2003 – 05 
Sebastian Kessing 
Robert Nuscheler 
Monopoly Pricing with Negative Network Effects: 
The Case of Vaccines 
SP II 2003 – 06 
Lars Frisell 
 
The Breakdown of Authority SP II 2003 – 07 
Paul Heidhues 
Nicolas Melissas 
Equilibria in a Dynamic Global Game: The Role of 
Cohort Effects 
SP II 2003 – 08 
Pablo Beramendi Political Institutions and Income Inequality:   
The Case of Decentralization 
SP II 2003 – 09 
Daniel Krähmer Learning and Self-Confidence in Contests SP II 2003 – 10 
Ralph Siebert The Introduction of New Product Qualities by 
Incumbent Firms:  Market Proliferation versus 
Cannibalization 
SP II 2003 – 11 
Vivek Ghosal Impact of Uncertainty and Sunk Costs on Firm 
Survival and Industry Dynamics 
SP II 2003 – 12 
Vivek Ghosal Endemic Volatility of Firms and Establishments: 
Are Real Options Effects Important? 
SP II 2003 – 13 
Andreas Blume 
Paul Heidhues 
Private Monitoring in Auctions SP II 2003 – 14 
Sebastian Kessing Delay in Joint Projects SP II 2003 – 15 
Tomaso Duso 
Astrid Jung 
Product Market Competition and Lobbying 
Coordination in the U.S. Mobile 
Telecommunications Industry 
SP II 2003 – 16 
Thomas R. Cusack 
Pablo Beramendi 
Taxing Work: Some Political and Economic 
Aspects of Labor Income Taxation 
SP II 2003 – 17 
Kjell Erik Lommerud 
Frode Meland 
Odd Rune Straume 
Globalisation and Union Opposition to 
Technological Change 
SP II 2003 – 18 
Joseph Clougherty Industry Trade-Balance and Domestic Merger 
Policy:  Some Empirical Evidence from the U.S. 
SP II 2003 – 19 
Dan Anderberg 
Fredrik Andersson 
Stratification, Social Networks in the Labour 
Market, and Intergenerational Mobility 
SP II 2003 – 20 
Eugenio J. Miravete 
Lars-Hendrik Röller 
Estimating Markups under Nonlinear Pricing 
Competition 
SP II 2003 – 21 
Talat Mahmood 
Klaus Schömann 
On the Migration Decision of IT-Graduates:   
A Two-Level Nested Logit Model 
SP II 2003 – 22 
Talat Mahmood 
Klaus Schömann 
Assessing the Migration Decision of Indian  
IT-Graduates: An Empirical Analysis 
SP II 2003 – 23 
Suchan Chae 
Paul Heidhues 
Buyers Alliances for Bargaining Power SP II 2003 – 24 
Sigurt Vitols Negotiated Shareholder Value: The German 
Version of an Anglo-American Practice 
SP II 2003 – 25 
Michal Grajek Estimating Network Effects and Compatibility in 
Mobile Telecommunications 
SP II 2003 – 26 
Kai A. Konrad Bidding in Hierarchies SP II 2003 – 27 
Helmut Bester 
Kai A. Konrad 
Easy Targets and the Timing of Conflict SP II 2003 – 28 
Kai A. Konrad Opinion Leaders, Influence Activities and 
Leadership Rents 
SP II 2003 – 29 
Kai A. Konrad Mobilität in mehrstufigen Ausbildungsturnieren SP II 2003 – 30 
Steffen Huck 
Kai A. Konrad 
Moral Cost, Commitment and Committee Size SP II 2003 – 31 
 
 
DISCUSSION PAPERS 2004 
 
 
Jos Jansen Partial Information Sharing in Cournot Oligopoly SP II 2004 – 01 
Johan Lagerlöf 
Lars Frisell 
Lobbying, Information Transmission, and Unequal 
Representation 
SP II 2004 – 02 
Sigurt Vitols Changes in Germany’s Bank Based Financial 
System: A Varieties of Capitalism Perspective 
SP II 2004 – 03 
Lutz Engelhardt Entrepreneurial Business Models in the German 
Software Industry: Companies, Venture Capital, 
and Stock Market Based Growth Strategies of the 
‚Neuer Markt’ 
SP II 2004 – 04 
Antonio Guarino 
Steffen Huck 
Thomas D. Jeitschko 
Can Fear Cause Economic Collapse? 
Insights from an Experimental Study 
SP II 2004 – 05 
Thomas Plümper  
Vera E. Troeger 
External Effects of Currency Unions SP II 2004 – 06 
Ulrich Kaiser¤ An Estimated Model of the German Magazine 
Market 
SP II 2004 – 07 
Pablo Beramendi 
Thomas R. Cusack 
Diverse Disparities: The Politics and Economics of 
Wage, Market and Disposable Income Inequalities 
SP II 2004 – 08 
Joseph Clougherty Antitrust Holdup Source, Cross-National 
Institutional Variation, and Corporate Political 
Strategy Implications for Domestic Mergers in a 
Global Context 
SP II 2004 – 09 
Joseph Clougherty 
Anming Zhang 
Export Orientation and Domestic Merger Policy:  
Theory and Some Empirical Evidence 
SP II 2004 – 10 
Roel C.A. Oomen Modelling Realized Variance when Returns are 
Serially Correlated 
SP II 2004 – 11 
Robert J. Franzese,Jr. 
Jude C. Hays 
Modeling International Diffusion: Inferential 
Benefits and Methodological Challenges, with an 
Application to International Tax Competition 
SP II 2004 – 12 
Albert Banal-Estañol 
Inés Macho-Stadler 
Jo Seldeslachts 
Mergers, Investment Decisions and Internal 
Organisation 
SP II 2004 – 13 
Oz Shy 
Rune Stenbacka 
Price Competition, Business Hours, and Shopping 
Time Flexibility 
SP II 2004 – 14 
Jonathan Beck Fixed, focal, fair?  Book Prices Under Optional 
resale Price Maintenance 
SP II 2004 – 15 
Michal Grajek Diffusion of ISO 9000 Standards and International 
Trade 
SP II 2004 – 16 
Paul Heidhues 
Botond Kőszegi 
The Impact of Consumer Loss Aversion on Pricing SP II 2004 – 17 
Bei Ihren Bestellungen von WZB-Papers schicken 
Sie bitte unbedingt einen an Sie adressierten Auf-
kleber mit sowie je paper eine Briefmarke im Wert 
von 0,51 Euro oder einen "Coupon Reponse Inter-
national " (für Besteller aus dem Ausland) 
 Please send a self addressed label and postage 
stamps in the amount of 0.51 Euro or a "Coupon- 
Reponse International" (if you are ordering from 
outside Germany) for each WZB-paper requested 
 
Bestellschein Order Form 
 
 
 
 
Absender / Return Address: 
 
 
 
Wissenschaftszentrum Berlin 
für Sozialforschung 
Presse- und informationsreferat 
Reichpietschufer 50 
 
D-10785 Berlin-Tiergarten  
 
 
 
Hiermit bestelle ich folgende(s) 
Discussion paper(s): 
 
 
 
Please send me the following 
Discussion paper(s): 
Bestell-Nr. / Order no. Autor/in, Kurztitel /Author(s) / Title(s) in brief 
  
 
